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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes and summarizes each element of a claim for tortious
interference with a contract or a business relationship under Ohio law, and it argues
what conduct should constitute tortious interference. The purpose of the Article is
two-fold: (1) to guide practitioners in proving and defending against claims of
tortious interference with a contract or a business relationship; and (2) to provide a
detailed roadmap for the legal community to define the law of tortious interference in
a manner that promotes good public policy.
Ohio courts1 recognize two distinct claims for tortious interference:
(1) interference with a contract; and (2) interference with a business relationship.2
* J.D., 2003, Magna Cum Laude, Order of the Coif, Indiana University School of Law at
Bloomington; B.A. in Economics with Honors, 2000, University of North Carolina at Chapel
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The main distinction between these two claims is that a claim for interference with a
contract applies only to contracts that are not terminable at will, but a claim for
interference with a business relationship applies to both “prospective contractual
relations[] not yet reduced to a contract” and contracts or agreements terminable at
will.3 In this Article (unless otherwise noted), tortious interference with a contract
refers solely to contracts not terminable at will, and tortious interference with a
business relationship refers to contracts terminable at will, business relationships,
and prospective business relationships.4 The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted
section 766 of Restatement (Second) of Torts and has set forth five elements to
establish tortious interference with a contract or business relationship: (1) the
existence of a valid contract or business relationship between a plaintiff and a third
party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the contract or business relationship; (3) the
defendant’s intentional inducement of the breach or termination of the contract or
business relationship; (4) the defendant’s engagement in improper and unprivileged
conduct (e.g., the commission of a fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty); and (5)
damages resulting from the defendant’s actions.5
Hill. Mr. Voigt is an attorney with the firm of Faruki Ireland & Cox P.L.L. (“FI&C”) in
Dayton, Ohio. FI&C is a mid-sized law firm with a practice in national complex business
litigation. FI&C handles commercial disputes of all types, including class actions, intellectual
property (e.g., patent, copyright, trademark and trade secrets), antitrust, securities, false
advertising, employment and discrimination, and product liability cases. I thank Laura A.
Sanom, Angela M. Sinkovits, and Robert W. Gurry for providing helpful comments and
criticisms to me. This Article represents the opinions of the author and not necessarily the
opinions of FI&C or its clients.
1

Ohio courts include decisions by the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ohio Court of Appeals,
District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals (when construing Ohio law).
Morevoer, because this Article aids practitioners in the State of Ohio, full case citations
retain the name of the county in which the opinion was issued.
2

Extracorporeal Alliance, L.L.C. v. Rosteck, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1040-41, 1043-44
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Ohio law recognizes both the tort of intentional interference with a
contract and the tort of intentional interference with a prospective contractual relationship.”);
Chandler & Assocs. v. America’s Healthcare Alliance, 709 N.E.2d 190, 198 (Ohio Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County 1997) (“[T]ortious interference with a contractual relationship which,
although similar in form, is distinguishable from the substantive law of tortious interference
with a business relationship.”).
3

Diamond Wine & Spirits v. Dayton Heidelberg Distrib. Co., 774 N.E.2d 775, 780-81
(Ohio Ct. App. Allen County 2002); Lapping v. HM Health Servs., No. 2000-T-0061, 2001
Ohio App. LEXIS 5634, at *23 (Ohio Ct. App. Trumbull County Dec. 14, 2001) (citing
Reagan v. Ranger Transp., Inc., No. 97-P-0102, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5824, at *16 (Ohio
Ct. App. Portage County Dec. 4, 1998)).
4

For a detailed discussion on the difference between a contract not terminable at will and
an at-will contract, see infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
5

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999); Kenty v.
Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, syllabus ¶ 2 (Ohio 1995) (setting forth same
elements); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (“One who intentionally and
improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between
another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the
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Parts II, IV, and VI discuss the first (existence of a contract or relationship), third
(intent), and fifth (damages) elements, respectively. Ohio courts have adequately
defined these elements, and this Article does not set forth new modifications to them.
Although the Ohio common law has acknowledged a claim for tortious
interference for at least sixty-five years,6 large gaps in Ohio interference law still
exist.7 Ohio courts have not: (1) addressed what type of knowledge (e.g., actual or
constructive) is necessary for liability to attach (second element); (2) provided
adequate guidance as to what actions are improper and unprivileged (which
commonly determines whether a defendant is liable) (fourth element); and
(3) addressed the situation where a defendant induces a breach of a contract and then,
while the contract remains in effect, induces a termination of the contract. This
Article builds bridges over these gaps and proposes clarifications and modifications
to Ohio law. The foundation of these bridges is based on the law of tortious
interference in Ohio and jurisdictions outside of Ohio, the law of Ohio outside of the
interference context, and public policies that encourage competition and protect the
expectancy interests of parties to contracts and business relationships.
Part III argues that Ohio law should not require a defendant to have actual
knowledge of a contractual or business relationship, but rather that a defendant’s
constructive knowledge of such a relationship should be sufficient for a plaintiff to
prove the requisite knowledge. Under this proposed clarification to Ohio law, a
defendant must reasonably inquire whether a contract or business relationship exists
when the defendant has knowledge of facts that a third party may have an existing,
conflicting contract or business relationship. Constructive knowledge (in contrast to
actual knowledge) discourages would-be interferers from engaging in deliberate
ignorance as to the existence of a third party’s contract or business relationship.
Part V.A.2-3 argues that courts should determine whether conduct is improper,
not based only on competition, but also on whether the defendant induced the breach
or termination of a contract not terminable at will or a business relationship. Parties
to binding contracts have a legal right to future performance during the term of the
contract, but parties to business relationships and at-will contracts have only an
expectancy of continued relations. Thus, contracts not terminable at will should
receive greater protection than business relationships against outside interference,
and more actions by a defendant should be improper when the breached or
terminated interest is a non-at-will contract than when the interest is an at-will
contract or a business relationship. Part V.B.1 proposes a new standard for at-will
contracts and business relationships: Ohio law should require an interferer to engage
in independently actionable conduct (e.g., a fraud or false and defamatory statement
made with malice) to be liable for tortious interference. Part V.B.2 argues that, for
contracts not terminable at will, Ohio courts should conclude that a defendant acts
improperly and without a privilege when it: (1) intentionally induces a breach or
contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the
failure of the third person to perform the contract.”).
6

Horth v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 35 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio Ct. App. Darke County 1940).

7

See Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that “tortious
interference with contract is not clear” in Ohio); see also Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 240
F. Supp. 2d 685, 689 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“[T]he fourth element of the tort of intentional
interference with contract is not well-defined in Ohio.”).
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termination of a non-at-will contract with actual or constructive knowledge of the
contract; or (2) makes a false statement with at least negligence as to its falsity.
Finally, Part VII discusses what constitutes the relevant period of interference—
the time period in which a defendant’s knowledge and actions may be used to
support a claim for tortious interference with a contract. This issue arises when the
date on which a contract is breached is different than the date on which the contract
is terminated. This Part argues that the interference period should extend until the
termination date of the contract.
To illustrate each element, this Article discusses a hypothetical situation where a
client seeks legal advice from his lawyer regarding the viability of potential tortious
interference claims against the client’s competitor and former salesperson. Imagine
the following scenario. The President of Sleepy, Inc. (“Sleepy”), a manufacturer of
alarm clocks, enters the office of his lawyer who is a partner with Great Lawyers &
Associates. The President (a rather eccentric character) proceeds to tell his lawyer
about his company’s most recent legal problems. Sleepy’s top sales representative,
aptly named Traitor Tom, has left Sleepy to start selling alarm clocks for Sleepy’s
largest competitor, Wake-Up Later, Inc. (“Wake-Up”). Traitor Tom’s employment
with Wake-Up violates his agreement not to compete with Sleepy within a twenty
mile radius of Sleepy for two years upon the termination of his employment and not
to solicit the customers of Sleepy (the “non-competition agreement”).
The attorney interjects, “How did Traitor Tom begin working for Wake-Up?”
The President explains that Wake-Up contacted Traitor Tom for an interview while
Sleepy employed him. During the interview, Wake-Up told Traitor Tom that Sleepy
was having severe financial problems and many executives at Sleepy intended to
resign. The President assures his lawyer that those statements were false. The
President concedes that Wake-Up had no actual knowledge that the statements were
false but that Wake-Up likely lacked a reasonable belief that the statements were
true.
The President of Sleepy further explains that Traitor Tom has highly agitated
Sleepy by soliciting Sleepy’s largest customers and convincing three customers to
terminate their business relationships with Sleepy (Sleepy had no contracts with
these customers) and instead to purchase alarm clocks from Wake-Up. The
President informs his lawyer that Traitor Tom sent letters to all customers he served
during his employment with Sleepy and that Traitor Tom offered the customers
heavily reduced prices if they immediately stopped purchasing alarm clocks from
Sleepy. The three customers who switched to Wake-Up informed Sleepy that they
were satisfied with Sleepy’s product but were enticed by the lower prices.
The President’s excitement rises another notch. The President explains that he
recently informed Wake-Up about Traitor Tom’s non-competition agreement and
demanded that Wake-Up immediately terminate Traitor Tom’s employment.
Wake-Up refused to discharge Traitor Tom, even though it conceded that the
non-competition agreement was enforceable (a surprising admission to both the
President and his lawyer). Wake-Up told the President that Traitor Tom never
disclosed the existence of the non-competition agreement to Wake-Up prior to his
employment with Wake-Up and that Wake-Up never asked whether such an
agreement existed. Wake-Up admitted that it learned about the non-competition
agreement soon after Wake-Up hired Traitor Tom.
The President believes that Sleepy has claims against Wake-Up for: (1) tortious
interference with a contract because Wake-Up induced Traitor Tom to violate his
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non-competition agreement; and (2) tortious interference with a business relationship
because Wake-Up made false statements about Sleepy to induce Traitor Tom to
work for Wake-Up. The President also thinks that Sleepy has a claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship against Traitor Tom for his intentional and
successful solicitation of three of Sleepy’s former customers.
The President fires numerous questions at the attorney. Is Traitor Tom liable for
persuading three of Sleepy’s customers to terminate their business relationships with
Sleepy? Before hiring Traitor Tom, should Wake-Up have asked the simple question
to Traitor Tom, “Are you bound by any contract that would be violated if Wake-Up
employs you?” If Wake-Up did so, may it rely upon the answer provided by Traitor
Tom? Does liability for Wake-Up hinge upon whether the non-competition
agreement is enforceable or whether Wake-Up made the false statements about
Sleepy’s financial troubles with malice (i.e., with knowledge that the statements
were false or in reckless disregard as to their falsity)? Once Wake-Up specifically
knows about the non-competition agreement, must Wake-Up terminate Traitor
Tom’s employment or place him in a new position to avoid liability for tortiously
interfering with this agreement? This Article answers all the President’s questions.
II. ELEMENT (1): EXISTENCE OF A VALID CONTRACT OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN A PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY
Ohio courts have adequately discussed the contours of the first element. To
assert a viable claim for interference with a contract, a plaintiff must have an
“enforceable contract” that is not terminable at will.8 The existence of a contract is a
question of law.9 A valid contract exists when there are “an offer and acceptance,
supported by valid consideration,”10 and a “meeting of the minds” of the parties.11
The contract must comply with public policy.12 Without a valid contract, a claim of
interference with a contract will often fail, and courts generally will not sua sponte
address the validity of a claim for interference with a business relationship.13 Thus,
attorneys should plead both claims to avoid a dismissal.

8
Bell v. Horton, 680 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ohio Ct. App. Ross County 1996); see infra
notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing when a contract is not terminable at will).
9

De Boer Structures (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 934,
949 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
10

Sashti, Inc. v. Glunt Indus., 140 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 (N.D. Ohio 2001).

11

Nilavar v. Osborn, 711 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ohio 1998).

12

Diamond Wine & Spirits v. Dayton Heidelberg Distrib. Co., 774 N.E.2d 775, 780-81
(Ohio Ct. App. Allen County 2002) (ruling that agreement violated public policy and was
unenforceable).
13

Griffin v. Griffin, Nos. CA2003-03-076, CA2003-04-081, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 671,
at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Butler County Feb. 17, 2004) (explaining that where a “valid and
enforceable contract d[id] not exist” dismissal of claim for interference with a contract was
proper); Bell, 680 N.E.2d at 1274 & n.2 (ruling that plaintiff’s interference with a contract
claim must fail “as a matter of law” because contract was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds; noting that an interference with a business relationship claim was “not before us”);
Hardie v. Shady Hollow Country Club, No. 1995CA00298, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2956, at
*8-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Stark County June 17, 1996) (upholding the grant of “summary

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

7

346

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:339

To prove a claim of interference with a business relationship, a plaintiff need not
have a binding, executed contract.14 The existence of a current business relationship
or a potential business relationship is sufficient.15 For example, a business
relationship exists when a plaintiff has an “understanding” with a third party that the
plaintiff would perform certain work for the third party.16 Prospective relationships
include relationships with potential customers.17
A defendant cannot tortiously interfere with its contracts or business
relationships. For a viable tortious interference claim, a defendant must interfere
with a contract or a business relationship between a plaintiff and third party, not a
relationship between a plaintiff and defendant.18 There is no third party with whom
to interfere when a plaintiff-employee files a tortious interference claim against the
plaintiff’s former supervisors19 or a subsidiary of plaintiff’s former employer.20 An

judgment on [plaintiffs’] claim for tortious interference with a contract” because employee
was terminable at will).
14
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858, 861 (Ohio 1999) (ruling that
the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to interferers on plaintiff-law firm’s
tortious interference claim, even though plaintiff had only business relationships with its
clients).
15
A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651
N.E.2d 1283, 1294 (Ohio 1995); Gray-Jones v. Jones, 738 N.E.2d 64, 69-70 (Ohio Ct. App.
Franklin County 2000).
16
Cooper v. Jones, No. 05CA7, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1606, at *15-17 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jackson County Mar. 29, 2006) (reversing the award of summary judgment in favor of
defendant; understanding between plaintiff and railroad company “established a business
relationship,” although any binding contract needed the approval of the city).
17
Elwert v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 602 N.E.2d 1219, 1223-24 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton
County 1992).
18

Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995); Tiger, Inc.
v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (“An essential
element of the tort is interference by someone who is not a party or agent of the party to the
contract or relationship at issue.”); Garg v. Venkataraman, 561 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ohio Ct.
App. Wayne County 1988) (“[N]o cause of action lies for interference with one’s own
contract.”).
19

Mulvin v. City of Sandusky, 320 F. Supp. 2d 627, 641 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (awarding
summary judgment to defendants-employees; “[a] person in a supervisory capacity or other
position of authority over the employee cannot be sued for interfering with the employment
relationship that it is his duty to monitor, supervise, or enforce” (quoting Smiddy v. Kinko’s,
Inc., No. C-020222, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 460, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County Jan.
31, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fitgerald v. Roadway Express, Inc., 262 F.
Supp. 2d 849, 860 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (granting motion to dismiss interference claim against
agent who acted on behalf of his employer); Condon v. Body, 649 N.E.2d 1259, 1265 (Ohio
Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1994) (finding that summary judgment in favor of defendant-agent
was appropriate; manager of firm “was not a third party subject to liability for tortiously
interfering with a contract to which the Firm was a party”); Contadino v. Tilow, 589 N.E.2d
48, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County 1990) (finding that summary judgment to defendantmanager was proper; manager was a party to the contract between plaintiff and his former
employer).
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agent, however, may be considered a third party to a contract between a plaintiffemployee and the plaintiff’s employer when the agent does not supervise the
plaintiff21 or the agent acts “solely in his or her individual capacity.”22 If a defendant
is a party to the contract or business relationship that is breached or terminated, then
the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.23
In the Sleepy/Wake-Up Hypothetical,24 Sleepy can prove the existence of a valid
contract and a business relationship for its claims of tortious interference with a
contract and a business relationship against Wake-Up and Traitor Tom. As to
Wake-Up, Sleepy (plaintiff) and its former employee, Traitor Tom (third party), have
a contract not terminable at will (the non-competition agreement), and Wake-Up
(defendant) is not a party to that agreement. Even if a court voided the noncompetition agreement, Sleepy could establish the first element as to Wake-Up
because Sleepy and Traitor Tom had an employment relationship, which constitutes
a valid business relationship. As to Traitor Tom, Sleepy had existing business
relationships with the three customers (third parties) who Traitor Tom (defendant)
successfully solicited. Of course, Sleepy cannot assert an interference claim against
Traitor Tom for his breach of the non-competition agreement.
III. ELEMENT (2): A DEFENDANT MUST KNOW ABOUT THE CONTRACT OR THE
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP THAT IS BREACHED OR TERMINATED
Unlike the first element (a valid contract or business relationship), Ohio courts
need to define the extent of knowledge necessary for a plaintiff to establish the
knowledge (second) element. Ohio courts should allow both actual and constructive
knowledge to be sufficient for an interference claim. The lower standard of
constructive knowledge requires a potential interferer to engage in a reasonable
inquiry to determine whether a third party has an existing contract or a business
relationship when the interferer has knowledge of sufficient facts to indicate that the
20
Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharm., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601-02 (6th Cir. 1988)
(construing Ohio law and affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant;
defendant-parent could not tortiously interfere with plaintiff’s contract with defendant’s
wholly-owned subsidiary).
21
Floyd v. Thomas, No. CA99-07-016, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2760, at *17-18 (Ohio Ct.
App. Preble County June 26, 2000) (holding that defendant was not entitled to summary
judgment where there were “genuine issues of material fact regarding whether [defendant] was
acting within the scope of her authority”).
22

Tessmer v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., No. 98AP-1278, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4633, at
*21 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County Sept. 30, 1999) (citing Miller v. Wikel Mfg. Co., 545
N.E.2d 76, 78-79 (Ohio 1989)).
23
Melott v. ACC Operations, Inc., No. 05-CV-063, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46328, at *2324 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment since there
was “no ‘third party’ with which to interfere”); Sanabria v. Germain Motor Co., No. C2:04-cv508, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20683, at *12-13 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2005) (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant-employer because defendant “induced no third party to
interfere with the prospective contract” and because “a defendant’s mere refusal to deal with a
party cannot support a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
24

See supra Part I.
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third party may have a contract or a business relationship that could conflict with the
proposed contract or business relationship. The constructive knowledge standard has
been adopted by most jurisdictions outside of Ohio that have addressed this standard
(jurisdictions that, like Ohio, follow Restatement (Second) of Torts section[CRD1]
766), and it encourages would-be interferers to learn about and respect the sanctity of
others’ contracts and business relationships.
The constructive knowledge standard does not transform an intentional
interference claim (which Ohio recognizes) into a claim of negligent interference
(which Ohio does not recognize)25 because this proposed standard requires
intentional conduct. Under the constructive knowledge standard, a defendant’s duty
to reasonably inquire as to the existence of a third party’s contract or business
relationship is triggered only if the defendant has knowledge of sufficient facts to
alert the defendant that the third party may have a contract or business relationship
that could be breached or terminated if the defendant and third party enter into the
proposed relationship. When a defendant has knowledge of sufficient facts and fails
to engage in a reasonable inquiry, the defendant has intentionally and willfully
remained ignorant of the third party’s contract or business relationship. Such willful
ignorance constitutes intentional, not negligent, conduct. Indeed, at least one court
(without explanation) has specifically rejected the contention that allowing
constructive knowledge would impose liability for negligent interference.26
Further, a defendant acts with the requisite intent if it acts with knowledge that
“interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its actions.”27
When an interferer fails to inquire in the face of knowledge of sufficient facts and
enters into a contract or a business relationship with a third party that conflicts with
the third party’s existing relationship, the interferer has engaged in conduct that
makes interference with the existing relationship “certain or substantially certain to
occur.”
A. What Constitutes Sufficient Knowledge Is Unclear Under Ohio Law
Only one Ohio court has expressly addressed whether constructive knowledge of
the existence of a contract or business relationship (or the terms of such a contract or
relationship) is sufficient to satisfy the knowledge (second) element. In that case, the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the interferer that allowing constructive knowledge would
“wrongly import[] a negligence standard” into Ohio interference law.28 The Sixth
Circuit’s ruling is not persuasive. The court offered no rationale and cited no cases
25

Dorricott v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging, 2 F. Supp. 2d 982, 990 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (explaining
that “Ohio does not recognize negligent interference” with a contract or “business
relationship”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 187 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999).
26

Indy Lube Inves., L.L.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (D. Kan.
2002) (rejecting argument that plaintiff pled “a claim for negligent rather than intentional
interference with contract” by alleging that defendant “knew or should have known . . . of the
contract”; the “knowledge element may consist of actual or constructive knowledge”).
27

RFC Capital Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., No. 03AP-735, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6507, at
*48 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County. Dec. 23, 2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 cmt. j (1979)) .
28

Crown Equip. Corp. v. Toyota Material Handling, U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-4476, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26896, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2006).
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to support its conclusion other than noting that “negligent interference” is not
actionable in Ohio.29 The Sixth Circuit also summarily dismissed other jurisdictions’
rulings that constructive knowledge is sufficient, stating that those rulings “are not
binding on this court.”30
The other few Ohio rulings that have addressed the knowledge element appear
inconsistent. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in stating that the knowledge element
requires “knowledge of the contract,” implied that actual knowledge of a contract or
a business relationship is necessary.31 One Ohio court appeared to require actual
knowledge where it was customary in the industry for the plaintiff not to have
contracts with the third party.32 Another court has implied that specific knowledge
of the terms of a contract is necessary.33 Finally, one court has implied that
constructive knowledge is sufficient.34
B. Jurisdictions Outside of Ohio Have Adopted the Constructive Knowledge
Standard
The majority of courts that have specifically addressed the knowledge element
(e.g., Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin) have
ruled that constructive knowledge of the existence of a contract or a business
relationship satisfies this element.35 Each court adopting this standard has applied

29

Id. at *11 n.2.

30

Id. at *11 n.3 (citing several courts that adopted the constructive knowledge standard).

31

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999).

32

Akron Group Servs., Inc. v. Patron Plastics, Inc., No. 22507, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS
4616, at *11-12, *14-16 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County Sept. 28, 2005) (upholding the grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants; there was no evidence that defendants “were
aware of any contract” between plaintiff (a temporary service provider) and the third-party
employer for the hiring of temporary employees where defendants testified that employers
who hire temporary employees from temporary service providers “typically decline to sign
contractual agreements with temporary service providers”).
33

Danberry Co. v. Benderson Dev. Co., No. L-90-288, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2479, at
*10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Lucas County May 15, 1992) (affirming jury finding of tortious
interference; “there is competent, credible evidence to show that . . . defendants knew of the
single party listing agreement” between plaintiff and a third party). Whether general
knowledge of the agreement would have satisfied the knowledge element was not at issue in
Danberry.
34

Schiavoni v. Steel City Corp., 727 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning County
1999) (reversing the trial court’s OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of the claim of tortious
interference with a contract; allegation that the defendant had “actual or constructive
knowledge that the Client was represented by counsel and that Plaintiff had a contract with
Client” was sufficient) (emphasis added).
35

Burns v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 02-254, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9518, at *23-24 (D. Minn.
May 23, 2003) (“[A]ctual knowledge of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party” is
unnecessary, as long as a defendant has “knowledge of sufficient facts which, if followed by
reasonable inquiry, would have led to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and
the rights of the parties.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Indy Lube Inves.,
L.L.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (D. Kan. 2002) (“[T]his knowledge
element may consist of actual or constructive knowledge.” (citing Petroleum Energy, Inc. v.
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the law of a state that, like Ohio, has adopted section 766 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts, or is guided by it.36 Additionally, like Ohio, none of the jurisdictions that have
adopted the constructive knowledge standard recognize a claim of negligent

Mid-America Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420, 1429 (D. Kan. 1991))); Tele-Port v.
Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (setting forth
constructive knowledge standard); D 56, Inc. v. Berry’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 908, 916 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (setting forth “‘constructive’ knowledge” standard); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere
& Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 1999) (upholding jury instructions on knowledge element
that stated: “It is not necessary that the Defendant had actual knowledge of the specific
contract. It is sufficient that the Defendant had knowledge of facts which, if followed by
reasonable inquiry, would have lead to the disclosure of the contractual relationship.”); Exxon
Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 656 (Tex. App. 1991) (Knowledge is sufficient when a
“party ha[s] knowledge of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to
believe in the existence of the contract and the plaintiff’s interest in it.”); Crye-Leike Realtors
v. WDM, Inc., No. 02A01-9711-CH-00287, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *16 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 1998) (adopting standard in Exxon Corp.).
New Jersey law, however, has rejected the constructive knowledge standard. Digiorgio
Corp. v. Mendez & Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (D.N.J. 2002) (“General knowledge . . . is
not sufficient”; an interferer must “have specific knowledge of the contract right upon which
his actions infringe.”).
36

Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that New York
courts have adopted Sections 766 and 767), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984); JamSports &
Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama Prods., 360 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906-07 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Illinois
courts have frequently relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in assessing tortious
interference claims”); V.C. Video, Inc. v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 962, 970-71 (D. Kan.
1990) (“Kansas generally follows the test set forth in” sections 766 and 767); Yeager’s Fuel v.
Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has adopted both §§ 766 and 767.”); AmeriGas Propane v. Crook, 844 F. Supp.
379, 389 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (applying Section 766 to define an intent to interfere); Nesler v.
Fisher & Co., 452 N.W.2d 191, 194, 197-98 (Iowa 1995) (agreeing with the standard in
Sections 766 and 767); Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112, 117 (Md. App. 1994)
(following Sections 766, 767, and 768); Metge v. Cent. Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n,
649 N.W.2d 488, 499-500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Section 766 with approval); Eloise
Bauer & Assocs. v. Elec. Realty Assocs., 621 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App. 1981) (guided by
Sections 766 and 767); Sampson Invs. v. Jondex Corp., 499 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Wis. 1993)
(adopting Section 766).
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interference.37 Leading commentators agree with the adoption of the constructive
knowledge standard.38
C. Public Policy Favors the Constructive Knowledge Standard
If adopted in Ohio, the constructive knowledge standard would require
defendants to take reasonable affirmative steps to learn about the existence of a
contract or a business relationship (and the relevant details) between a plaintiff and
third party. The actual knowledge standard would have the opposite effect.
Requiring an interferer to have actual knowledge of a contract or a business
relationship would allow the interferer to escape liability by engaging in deliberate
ignorance and not asking the third party the simple question, “Do you have an
existing contract or a business relationship that would conflict with or be violated by
the terms of our proposed relationship?” To discourage “deliberate ignorance” in
other contexts, courts have rejected an actual knowledge standard.39 As the Fourth
Circuit noted, tortious interference law should not reward interferers for taking no

37
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., 395 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying
Minnesota law; requiring the “tortfeasor’s intentional causation of a breach of the contract”);
Cody v. Harris, 409 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Illinois law; there must be an
“intentional inducement of a contract breach”); Duct-O-Wire Co. v. United States Crane, 31
F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wisconsin law; plaintiff must prove that “the
interference was intentional”); Rodriguez v. ECRI Shared Servs., 984 F. Supp. 1363, 1366-67
(D. Kan. 1997) (stating that plaintiff must show an “intentional procurement of [a] breach” or
“intentional misconduct by defendant”); Reihmann v. Foerstner, 375 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa
1985) (explaining that to be liable for tortious interference, a defendant must “intentionally
and improperly interfere[]”); Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 405 (Tenn. 2002) (for
statutory or common law claim of interference, defendant must act with an intent to interfere);
Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996) (requiring “a willful and
intentional act of interference”).
38
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 982 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) (“Intentional interference of course presupposes knowledge of the plaintiff’s contract or
interest, or at least of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such interest
exists.”) (emphasis added); Steven W. Feldman, Tortious Interference with Contract in
Tennessee: A Practitioner’s Guide, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 281, 300 (2001) (“The prevailing
view is that the defendant need only know of the existence of the contract being obstructed or
that he has knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a contract
exists.”); 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interference § 9 (2007)(“It is not necessary to prove actual
knowledge; it is enough to show that defendant had knowledge of facts which, if followed by
reasonable inquiry, would have led to complete disclosure of the contractual relations and
rights of the parties.”).
39
In determining what constitutes willful non-compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), courts have ruled that a defendant may act willfully, even though the
defendant lacks knowledge that its conduct is unlawful. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs.
Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that not requiring knowledge that the
act is unlawful avoids the “perverse incentives for companies covered by FCRA to avoid
learning the law’s dictates”); Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1229
(D.N.M. 2006) (“[R]equiring FCRA plaintiffs to prove the defendant actually knew that it was
violating the law would create perverse incentives for credit reporting agencies to pursue a
policy of deliberate ignorance of the law in order to avoid liability for punitive damages.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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action or for taking actions that keep interferers ignorant of others’ contracts and
business relationships.40
D. Proposed Clarification to Ohio Law: Constructive Knowledge Is Sufficient
Based on other jurisdictions and sound public policy, Ohio courts should
specifically adopt the constructive knowledge standard for a claim of interference
with a contract or a business relationship. Under this proposed clarification to Ohio
law, once a defendant has actual knowledge of sufficient facts, it must engage in a
“reasonable inquiry” to determine whether the third party has a contract or a business
relationship that could conflict with the defendant and third party’s proposed contract
or business relationship.41 Constructive knowledge exists when a defendant has
“knowledge of facts which, if followed by inquiry ordinarily made by a reasonable
and prudent person, would have led to a disclosure of the contractual [or business]
relationship.”42 Evidence that a defendant should have known about a third party’s
existing contract or business relationship and failed to undertake a reasonable effort
to learn about such a relationship should be sufficient for a plaintiff to prove the
knowledge element. A defendant is not subject to liability, however, when the
defendant lacked knowledge of sufficient facts to warrant an inquiry or when a
reasonable inquiry could not have revealed the contract or business relationship.43
At a minimum, a defendant should have a duty to ask the third party whether the
third party is bound by any conflicting contract (or business relationship) when the
defendant has actual knowledge that: (1[CRD2]) the third party has at least a business

40

Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc., No. 99-1357,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3394, at *12-14 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2000) (finding that the district court
erred by granting summary judgment to interferer; defendant is not “insulated from liability
because it did not know about the franchise agreement’s restrictions” where defendant never
asked for a copy of the agreement, despite its knowledge that an agreement existed, and where
defendant “had ample opportunity to educate itself as to its terms”).
41

Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 1999).

42
Tele-Port v. Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Wis.
1999); see cases cited supra note 36.

Other non-Ohio courts (e.g., Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania) have expressly
rejected a standard that would require an interferer to possess specific knowledge of the terms
of a contract or business relationship. CompuSpa, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. DKC
2002-0507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11922, at *20-22 (D. Md. June 29, 2004) (finding that
defendant’s lack of knowledge of the “30-day notice provision in the contracts is of no
moment”; “knowledge of the existence of the contract” is sufficient) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); Hidden Brook Air, Inc. v. Thabet Aviation Int’l Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d
246, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment to defendant; knowledge of the “legal
particulars of the contract” was unnecessary); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102,
1112 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (explaining that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) “does
not require knowledge of the specific terms of the contract”).
43

ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Sys., 296 F.3d 657, 662-63 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Iowa
law; summary judgment to defendant was proper because a “reasonable inquiry” by defendant
would not have revealed the previous contracts between plaintiff and third party; defendant
knew only that plaintiff was “in discussions” over a new contract).
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relationship with the plaintiff;44 (2) in the business market in which the defendant
interfered, it is standard for persons or entities similarly situated like the third party
to have contracts (or business relationships); and (3) although not common in the
industry, the plaintiff or defendant generally has contracts (or business relationships)
with persons or entities similarly situated to the third party.45 In these circumstances,
a defendant knows sufficient facts to alert the defendant that it must ask the simple
question to the third party, “Do you have any contract or a business relationship that
may be breached or terminated as a result of our proposed relationship?” The
constructive knowledge standard, however, does not impose a duty on a defendant to
always ask whether a contract or a business relationship exists. If a defendant has no
actual knowledge of any contractual or business relationship and the circumstances
do not indicate otherwise, then the defendant is not required to inquire about such a
relationship.46
To satisfy its duty to reasonably inquire, a defendant may rely solely on the
answer given by the third party. Where the inquiring potential interferer receives
and relies upon false information and has reasonable grounds to do so, the interferer
should not be held liable. First, it is impractical to require businesses in all situations
to seek further evidence to corroborate a third party’s response that no contract or
business relationship exists that would be breached or terminated. Second, a
defendant should have no obligation to contact a plaintiff (the injured party) about
any conflicting agreements or relationships the plaintiff has with the third party. In
the employment context, for instance, such a requirement would hinder the mobility
of employees, as many employees interview with other companies without the
knowledge of their current employer. Third, the constructive knowledge standard
imposes the difficult task upon an interferer to discover a negative[CRD3] (i.e., the

44

Courts have ruled that a plaintiff proves constructive knowledge if the defendant knows
some type of agreement or relationship exists and does not further investigate. D 56, Inc. v.
Berry’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 908, 916, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff’s interference with contract claim; “regardless of whether
defendants received a copy of the agreement,” a reasonable jury could determine that the letter
by plaintiff put defendant on notice of plaintiff’s agreements with the third parties from which
defendant purchases products); Enesco Corp. v. K’s Merch. Mart, Inc., No. 99 C 1070, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17326, at *22-24 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2000) (denying summary judgment for
defendant because plaintiff need not prove that defendant “s[aw] and read the contract”);
Revere, 595 N.W.2d at 759, 764 (affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff; defendant’s
knowledge that employees (third parties) had “employment agreements” with plaintiffemployer was sufficient “to put [defendant] on notice” of the “nondisclosure-confidentiality
agreement,” even though defendant argued that it had no specific knowledge of that binding
agreement).
45
Crye-Leike Realtors v. WDM, Inc., No. 02A01-9711-CH-00287, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 641, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998) (holding that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant because “actual knowledge of the existence
of a contract” was unnecessary; defendant “knew that brokers [of plaintiff] usually attempted
to get their clients to sign agreements with them” but did not inquire further into the
relationship between plaintiff’s brokers and their clients).
46
What type of inquiry is reasonable cannot be completely addressed in a vacuum. This
Article provides only some examples of what type of inquiry should relieve a defendant of
liability.
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absence of an existing contract or a business relationship). Consequently, even if the
law required evidence to corroborate a third party’s answer, a further inquiry by a
defendant may be futile. An employer seeking to hire from its competitor an
employee who is bound by a non-competition agreement could ask the employee for
his or her employment agreement, but the employee could produce his or her
employment handbook rather than the agreement containing the non-competition
provision.
As an evidentiary matter, though, businesses are well advised to obtain
corroborating evidence. An interferer could communicate with the third party
through writings or could review a copy of the third party’s contract with the
plaintiff. Such actions will assist a defendant in establishing that it reasonably
inquired and in prevailing on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
A defendant should not escape liability by relying on a third party’s answer that no
conflicting contract exists when the answer is inconsistent with a defendant’s actual
knowledge that such a contract is common in the industry, or the answer directly
conflicts with other reliable information, such as a communication from the third
party’s employer that he or she is bound by a non-competition agreement. Under
those circumstances, a defendant knows sufficient facts that require a further inquiry.
E. Application of the Sleepy/Wake-Up Hypothetical to the Knowledge Element
Recall that the President of Sleepy believes he has: (1) a claim for tortious
interference with a contract against Sleepy’s competitor, Wake-Up, for its
interference with the non-competition agreement; and (2) a claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship against Wake-Up (assuming the noncompetition agreement is unenforceable) and against Sleepy’s former employee,
Traitor Tom. As to the latter claims, Sleepy could prove the requisite knowledge
because Wake-Up had actual knowledge of Traitor Tom’s employment relationship
with Sleepy before it interviewed him and because Traitor Tom had actual
knowledge of Sleepy’s business relationships with its customers before he solicited
them.
For Sleepy to satisfy the knowledge element for its claim of interference with the
non-competition agreement, Ohio law would have to adopt the constructive
knowledge standard (note that Wake-Up did not ask Traitor Tom whether he was
bound by any contract at the time Wake-Up interviewed him). Assume that noncompetition agreements are common in the alarm clock industry. Given this industry
standard, because Wake-Up failed to inquire whether Traitor Tom had a restrictive
employment agreement with Sleepy, Wake-Up failed to undertake a reasonable
inquiry. Now assume that Wake-Up did ask Traitor Tom during the interview
whether he was bound by a non-competition agreement and Traitor Tom responded,
“no.” Wake-Up still would be obligated to inquire because such agreements are
standard in the industry. Immediately after Traitor Tom accepted an offer of
employment, Wake-Up should have informed Sleepy of its employment of Traitor
Tom, which would have provided Sleepy an opportunity to inform Wake-Up about
the non-competition agreement.
Now suppose non-competition agreements are rare in this industry, but Wake-Up
knew that Sleepy required most of Sleepy’s employees to sign such agreements.
Wake-Up’s knowledge of such facts would trigger its duty to reasonably inquire
about Traitor Tom’s relationship with Sleepy for two independent reasons: Wake-Up
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knew that some type of employment relationship existed and knew that many other
employees of Sleepy signed non-competition agreements.
IV. ELEMENT (3): A DEFENDANT MUST INTEND TO INDUCE A BREACH OR
TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT OR BUSINESS A RELATIONSHIP
In addition to the knowledge element, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant
acted with an intent to interfere. The intent (third) element requires proof that: (1) a
contract or a business relationship was breached or terminated; (2) an interferer
intended to induce the breach or termination or knew that the breach or termination
was certain or substantially certain to occur; and (3) the interferer’s actions caused
the breach or termination. A plaintiff must establish all three sub-elements to prevail
on a claim for tortious interference with a contract or a business relationship. This
Article discusses each sub-element in turn.
A. A Breach or Termination of a Contract or a Business Relationship Must Occur
A claim for tortious interference with a contract requires a third party to breach
or terminate a contract that is not terminable at the will of the parties.47 “‘A breach
. . . occurs when a party demonstrates the existence of a binding contract or
agreement; the non-breaching party performed its contractual obligations; the
[breaching] party failed to fulfill its contractual obligations without legal excuse; and
the non-breaching party suffered damages as a result of the breach.’”48 An invalid
contract cannot be breached.49 In the absence of a breach or termination, a defendant
is not liable for interference with a contract.50
47

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999) (stating that the
intent element is satisfied by “‘[t]he wrongdoer’s intentional procurement of the contract’s
breach’” (quoting Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, syllabus ¶ 2
(Ohio 1995))); Cannon Group, Inc. v. Better Bags, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (stating that the intent element requires a defendant to induce “a contractual breach”
(citing Brookside Ambulance, Inc. v. Walker Ambulance Serv., 678 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ohio
Ct. App. Lucas County 1996))); Weinfeld v. Welling, No. 2003CA00247, 2004 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4432, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Stark County Sept. 13, 2004) (explaining that a breach or
termination satisfies the intent element (citing Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Dayton
Heidelberg Distrib. Co., 774 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ohio Ct. App. Allen County 2002))).
48
Laurent v. Flood Data Servs., 766 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ohio Ct. App. Lorain County 2001)
(quoting Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 661 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1995)).
49
Fitness Experience, Inc. v. TFC Fitness Equip., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892-93 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
because plaintiff could not enforce the non-competition agreements against defendant); Res.
Title Agency, Inc. v. Morreale Real Estate Servs., 314 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(“[A]n enforceable contract is one of the basic prerequisites of a breach of contract
claim.”(citing Garafalo v. Chicago Title Ins., Co., 661 N.E.2d 218, 266 (Ohio Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County 1995))).
50
Hubbard v. Dillingham, No. CA2002-02-045, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1386, at *2-3, *13
(Ohio Ct. App. Butler County Mar. 24, 2003) (ruling that summary judgment to defendant was
appropriate because “there was no breach of the lease contract”); Willis Refrigeration v.
Maynard, No. CA99-05-047, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 102, at *20, *24-25, *27-28 (Ohio Ct.
App. Clermont County Jan. 18, 2000) (affirming the lower court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction where plaintiff’s former employee “did not breach” his non-
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To establish the intent element for interference with a business relationship
claim, the third party must terminate a business relationship or at-will contract of the
parties,51 or cause the parties to refrain from entering into a business relationship.52
Without a termination or failure to enter into a business relationship, a defendant will
prevail.53
B. A Defendant Must Intend to Induce a Breach or Termination of a
Contract or a Business Relationship
In addition to a breach or termination, a defendant must act with an intent to
induce the breach or termination of a contract or a business relationship.54 Intent is
established by proving that the defendant either: (1) “acted with the purpose or desire
to interfere with the performance of the contract”; or (2) “knew that interference was
certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its actions.”55 Proof of a
defendant’s “‘personal ill will, spite or hatred’” toward a plaintiff is unnecessary to

competition agreement); Bell v. Horton, 680 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ohio Ct. App. Ross County
1996) (holding that claim for interference with a contract failed because the contract was
void).
51

Cannon Group, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 903; Zacks v. Beck, No. 04AP-1364, 2005 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4130, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County Sept. 1, 2005) (“[T]ortious interference
with a business relationship” requires a “termination of the relationship.”)(citing Geo-Pro
Servs. v. Solar Testing Labs., 763 N.E.2d 664, 672 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 2001))).
52

A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651
N.E.2d 1283, 1294 (Ohio 1995) (stating that intent requires “induc[ing] or otherwise
purposely caus[ing] a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with
another, or not to perform a contract with another” (citing Juhasz v. Quick Shops, Inc., 379
N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County 1977))).
53
Shah v. Cardiology S., Inc., No. 20440, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 195, at *1-2, *27-28
(Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County Jan. 21, 2005) (affirming the award of summary
judgment to defendant, which was the former practice group of plaintiff-physician; explaining
that plaintiff failed “to identify any former patient whose care was lost to [plaintiff]”).
54
Kand Med., Inc. v. Freund Med. Prods., Inc., 963 F.2d 125, 127, 129 (6th Cir. 1992)
(affirming the grant of summary judgment; the plaintiff lacked “evidence that [defendant]
intended Freund to breach the original contracts” with plaintiff).
55
RFC Capital Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., No. 03AP-735, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6507, at
*48 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County Dec. 23, 2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766 cmt. j (1979)); see McDonnell v. Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgical Assocs., No. C203-0079, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29437, at *25 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2004) (adopting same
standard as RFC Capital); Kenneth J. Majcen & Assocs. v. Phoenix Assocs., No. 76454, 2001
Ohio App. LEXIS 140, at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Jan. 18, 2001) (setting forth
substantially the same standard as RFC Capital); Miller v. Pennitech Indus. Tools, No. 2356M, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1622, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Medina County Apr. 19, 1995)
(setting forth similar standard as RFC Capital).

Some jurisdictions require a defendant to have “specifically intended to interfere with
[the] plaintiff.” E.g., Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1170 (3d Cir. 1993)
law (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 225, 250-51 (D.N.J.
1991)) (applying New Jersey tortious interference). No Ohio court has adopted that
heightened standard.
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prove intent.56 “Not every act of interference is intentional.”57 Ohio law, for
instance, “does not recognize negligent interference .”58
The knowledge and intent elements are intertwined. A defendant’s knowledge
(constructive or actual) of a contract or a business relationship is a prerequisite to a
finding of an intent to cause a breach or termination of the contract or the business
relationship. A defendant cannot intentionally interfere with a contract or a
relationship that is unknown to the defendant59 or that could not be discovered
through a reasonable inquiry. Nonetheless, a defendant’s “mere knowledge of the
plaintiff’s contract with the third-party and [the defendant’s] decision to contract
with the third-party in the face of that knowledge[,]” alone, does not establish an
intent to interfere.60 A computer software company, for instance, may know about a
potential customer’s agreements with other software companies and contract with
that customer for the sale of new and different software with no intent to induce a
termination of the customer’s existing agreements. Under those circumstances, Ohio
courts do not infer an intent to induce a breach or termination,61 and a defendant is
entitled to summary judgment.62

56

Canderm Pharm., Ltd. v. Elder Pharms., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Reichman v. Drake, 100 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County 1951)) (applying Ohio
law).
57

Zacks v. Beck, No. 04AP-1364, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4130, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App.
Franklin County Sept. 1, 2005) (citing Barno v. Empire Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 46499, 1983
Ohio App. LEXIS 12766 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Nov. 10, 1983)).
58
Dorricott v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging, 2 F. Supp. 2d 982, 990 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (citing
Smith v. Ameriflora 1992, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 1038, 1042-43 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County
1979)); Bauer v. Commercial Aluminum Cookware Co., 746 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (Ohio Ct.
App. Wood County 2000) (citing Smith, 644 N.E.2d at 1042-43).
59

RFC Capital, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6507, at *48-50 (holding that the trial court erred
in not granting defendant judgment as a matter of law because “[defendant] could not know,
much less intend, that its actions would interfere with [third party’s] obligations under the
Loan and Security Agreement”).
60

Midland Am. Sales - Weintraub, Inc, v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 164, 167
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (citing Horth v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 35 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio Ct. App.
Darke County 1940)).
61
Province v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 787 F.2d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying
Ohio law; intent not “‘inferred from the mere fact that a [defendant] enters into a contract with
one of two existing contracting parties with knowledge’ of the existing contract” (quoting
Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981))).
62

Kand Med., Inc. v. Freund Med. Prods., Inc., 963 F.2d 125, 127-28 (6th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting Ohio law; noting that defendant knew of business relationship and agreeing with
district court that “[defendant] did not have the requisite intent to induce a contractual
breach”); Heheman, 661 F.2d at 1126, 1127-28 (applying Ohio law and upholding summary
judgment to defendant on interference claim; although defendant admitted “it was aware of
[plaintiffs’] contractual obligations[,]” defendant’s “purpose” was not the “deprivation of
plaintiffs’ rights”).
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Because direct evidence of intent is rare, intent to induce a breach or termination
may be “inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”63 Courts draw reasonable
inferences of intent from evidence that an interferer: (1) had ill-will toward a
plaintiff;64 (2) made derogatory statements about the plaintiff after the third party
terminated its relationship with plaintiff;65 or (3) provided financial incentives to the
third party.66 Intent, however, may not be inferred when a defendant did not initially
solicit the third party67 or when a defendant directs its actions toward parties other
than the plaintiff.68
63

McDonnell v. Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgical Assocs., No. C2-03-0079, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29437, at *25 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2004), aff’d. 165 F. App’x 423 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Davis v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049, 1059 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery
County 1996)). Circumstantial evidence is often used to establish the intent element of other
intentional torts. E.g., Doyle v. Fairfield Mach. Co., 697 N.E.2d 667, 677 (Ohio Ct. App.
Trumbull Cty. 1997) (finding that circumstantial evidence of intent to defraud plaintiff was
sufficient to create an issue of fact); Davis, 671 N.E.2d at 1059 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery
County 1996) (finding that the trial court properly inferred an intent to mislead “from the
‘totality of the circumstances’” (citing Klapchar v. Dunbarton Props. Ltd., No. CA-8521, 1991
WL 249432, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Stark County Nov. 4, 1991))); see State v. Bergsmark, No.
L-03-1137, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5175, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Lucas County Oct. 29, 2004)
(“Purpose or intent can be established by circumstantial evidence from the surrounding facts
and circumstances.” (citing State v. Tiger, 772 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ohio Ct. App. Medina
County 2002))).
64

Hicks v. Bryan Med. Group, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 795, 801-02, 811 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(holding that plaintiff-doctor presented sufficient evidence that the defendant-hospital
encouraged patients and other physicians to complain about plaintiff’s treatment procedures,
which eventually led to his termination from his practice group); Ahmed v. Univ. Hosps.
Health Care Sys., Inc., No. 79016, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1843, at *7-8, *26 (Ohio Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County Apr. 18, 2002) (reversing the award of summary judgment for defendanthospital on claim that hospital tortiously interfered with plaintiff-physician’s prospective
relationships with his patients; jury could have found that hospital removed physician’s staff
privileges with the intent to “deny him the ability to treat patients in the area” because hospital
revoked physician’s privileges (and breached the hospital’s bylaws) at the same time it granted
privileges to other physicians).
65

Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686, 689, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(denying summary judgment for defendant where Fed Ex (the third party) terminated
plaintiff’s employment after defendant complained to Fed Ex because a jury could find that
defendant’s statement “that plaintiff ‘had got what he deserved’ . . . evidenced intent on
[defendant’s] part to have plaintiff fired”).
66

Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 277 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding, after a
bench trial, that “the evidence [wa]s clear that defendant BMC intentionally induced [third
party] to breach the . . . employment agreement” where defendant-employer “promised [third
party] a substantial increase in salary” and indemnification prior to the breach; finding of
intent was a factual determination); see Midland Am. Sales - Weintraub, Inc, v. Osram
Sylvania, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 164, 166, 168 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant; there was no evidence that defendant gave the third party “some improper
financial or other incentive to convince [third party] to breach his employment agreement with
[plaintiff]”).
67

Charles Gruenspan Co. v. Thompson, No. 80748, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3287, at *1011 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County July 10, 2003) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
defendant because intent was lacking; defendant-attorney presented undisputed testimony that
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C. A Defendant Must Cause the Breach or Termination of a Contract or a Business
Relationship
The third requirement under the intent element is that a defendant must cause the
breach or termination of a contract or a business relationship.69 The causation
requirement may be established by “circumstantial evidence.”70 Without evidence of
causation, summary judgment for a defendant will be granted.71 Although only a few
Ohio courts have addressed the distinction between an intent to interfere and
causation, these sub-elements are independent requirements. To illustrate, a
defendant may act with a purpose to induce a third party to breach a contract, but the
act may fail to effectuate such a breach. Alternatively, a third party may breach its
contract for reasons unrelated to a defendant’s intentional act.

he did not solicit plaintiff’s former client and that the client was dissatisfied with plaintiff’s
legal representation); Knox Mach., Inc. v. Doosan Mach., USA, Inc., No. CA2002-03-033,
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5226, at *12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. Warren County Sept. 30, 2002)
(affirming the grant of summary judgment to defendant because there was no intent when the
defendant answered an unsolicited question from the plaintiff’s customer, which resulted in
the customer severing its relationship with the plaintiff).
68

Zacks v. Beck, No. 04AP-1364, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4130, at *13-15 (Ohio Ct. App.
Franklin County Sept. 1, 2005) (affirming the grant of summary judgment to defendant).
69
A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651
N.E.2d 1283, 1294 (Ohio 1995) (stating that intent requires “induc[ing] or otherwise
purposely caus[ing]” a termination of a business relationship) (citations omitted); Universal
Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Eagle Window & Door, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 56, 61, 62 (Ohio Ct. App.
Hamilton County 1996) (entering “judgment as a matter of law” for defendant on interference
with contract claim because defendant did not “caus[e] a third person not to perform the
contract” between plaintiff and third party (citing Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co.,
650 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995))); Vitrano v. CWP Ltd. P’ship, No. 19516, 1999 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6179, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County Dec. 22, 1999) (requiring “a causal
connection . . . between the breach . . . and the actions of the defendant” (citing Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Triskett Ill., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County 1994))).
70
Jaro Transp. Servs. v. Grandy, No. 4:03-CV-01227, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62932, at
*47 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2006) (citing Wauseon Plaza, Ltd. P’ship v. Wauseon Hardware Co.,
807 N.E.2d 953, 964 (Ohio Ct. App. Fulton County 2004)); Hoover v. Curtis, No. 18580, 2001
Ohio App. LEXIS 2653, at *1-2, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County June 15, 2001)
(reversing the grant of summary judgment for interferer; “a jury could infer” that defendant’s
false statements “caused” the termination of plaintiff’s employment).
71
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 695, 706 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment where there was “no evidence that
the defendants here caused a breach of contract or business relationship”); Koukious v. Total
Access Techs., Inc., No. C-970700, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2217, at *6-8 (Ohio Ct. App.
Hamilton County May 22, 1998) (affirming summary judgment to defendant because
uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that plaintiff’s customer terminated its contract with the
plaintiff before the customer communicated with defendant); see Weinfeld v. Welling, No.
2003CA00247, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4432, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Stark County Sept. 13,
2004) (upholding jury verdict for defendant; plaintiff failed to prove that the “intentional
interference caused a breach or termination”).
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Causation “requires something more than a showing that a particular course of
conduct may have” influenced a third party.72 In Chrvala, the court granted
summary judgment to the defendant because evidence of causation was lacking.73
Plaintiff-employee contended that the disparaging statements made by his former
employer (the defendant) to plaintiff’s prospective employer (the third party) caused
the prospective employer not to hire the plaintiff. Chrvala concluded that the
uncontradicted evidence that the third party decided not to employ plaintiff for
reasons other than the defendant’s statements was sufficient to prove there was no
causation.74 Other courts are consistent with Chrvala, determining that causation
was lacking where third parties chose to terminate the relationships for reasons
independent of defendants’ actions.75
D. Application of the Sleepy/Wake-Up Hypothetical to the Intent Element
Based on the facts of the above hypothetical,76 Sleepy has sufficient evidence to
survive a dispositive motion on the intent element for Sleepy’s claims of tortious
interference with a business relationship against Traitor Tom and Wake-Up.
Regarding the claim against Traitor Tom, three of Sleepy’s customers terminated
their business relationships with Sleepy (a fact the President hates to admit); Traitor
Tom intentionally solicited the customers to terminate their relationships with Sleepy
by offering them substantially reduced prices; and Traitor Tom’s actions caused the
terminations (the customers admitted switching to Wake-Up because of the lower
prices). As to the claim against Wake-Up, Traitor Tom terminated his employment
with Sleepy; Wake-Up intentionally induced his termination (Wake-Up solicited
Traitor Tom with knowledge that Traitor Tom could not work for both Wake-Up and
Sleepy); and Wake-Up caused the termination, in substantial part, through its false
statements about the financial condition of Sleepy.
Proving the intent element on Sleepy’s claim against Wake-Up for its
interference with Traitor Tom’s non-competition agreement hinges upon what
knowledge standard Ohio law adopts. Assume that Wake-Up’s intent as of Traitor
Tom’s hiring date is the only relevant date.77 Under the actual knowledge standard,
72
Chrvala v. Borden, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citing Leibovitz v.
Central Nat’l Bank, 60 N.E.2d 727, 728-29 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1944)).
73

Id at 1023-24.

74

Id.

75

E.g., Stilson & Assocs. v. Stilson Consulting Group, Nos. 03-4458, 03-4542, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7971, at *18-19 (6th Cir. May 6, 2005) (construing Ohio law and affirming the
district court’s factual findings; explaining that “[d]efendants cannot be said to have caused
the termination of the relationship” because the third party was dissatisfied with plaintiffs’
work and the third party would have contracted with a new company regardless of defendants’
actions); Rigby v. Falls Equip. Co., 779 N.E.2d 1056, 1063-64 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit Cty.
2002) (stating that causation was lacking where the third parties testified in affidavits that they
were not influenced by defendant’s communications).
76

See supra Part I.

77

For the purpose of proving a claim of interference with a contract, the relevancy of a
defendant’s knowledge and actions after a contract is breached, but before the contract is
terminated, is discussed infra Part VII.
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Wake-Up would prevail because it cannot intend to induce a breach or termination of
the non-competition agreement if it lacked actual knowledge of its existence. If
Ohio courts adopt the constructive knowledge standard, however, then whether
Wake-Up intentionally caused the breach of the non-competition agreement should
be decided by the trier of fact. Wake-Up knew Sleepy employed Traitor Tom, yet
Wake-Up failed to ask whether Traitor Tom had any employment agreement with
Sleepy that may be breached. Under this circumstance, a reasonable fact finder
could conclude that Wake-Up’s deliberate ignorance as to the existence of the noncompetition agreement constitutes knowledge that “interference was certain or
substantially certain to occur.”
V. ELEMENT (4): A DEFENDANT MUST ENGAGE IN IMPROPER AND UNPRIVILEGED
CONDUCT
The fourth element requires proof that an interferer engaged in improper and
unprivileged conduct.78 Whether a defendant is found liable for tortious interference
with a contract or a business relationship or prevails on a dispositive motion
generally hinges upon whether the interference was improper and unprivileged.79
The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted the approach of Restatement (Second) of
Torts sections 767 and 768, which set forth two separate tests to determine whether a
defendant acted improperly and without a privilege. Under both sections, a plaintiff
has the burden to prove improper conduct,80 which includes (but is not limited to)
making false, defamatory statements with malice; disclosing confidential
information; abusing judicial process; and committing physical violence or fraud.81
Despite the adoption of the Restatement, the Ohio Supreme Court and other Ohio
courts have not defined adequately the contours of what conduct is improper.82 The

78
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999) (“Only improper
interference with a contract is actionable, as reflected in the fourth element of the tort. . . .”
(citing Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, 865-66 (Ohio 1996))). This
Article, like Ohio courts, uses the “terms improper and without privilege interchangeably.”
Wauseon Plaza, Ltd. P’ship v. Wauseon Hardware Co., 807 N.E.2d 953, 963 (Ohio Ct. App.
Fulton County 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
79

See infra notes 131-159 and accompanying text.

80

After two decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court (Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 858, and
Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, syllabus ¶ 2 (Ohio 1995)), which
set forth improper and unprivileged conduct as an element of an interference claim, courts
have consistently required a plaintiff to establish this element. E.g., Licul v. Swagelok Co.,
No. 86322, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 619, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Feb. 16,
2006) (citing Andrews v. Carmody, 761 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County
2001)); Super Sulky, Inc. v. United States Trotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 742 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citing Kenty, 650 N.E.2d at 866) (applying Ohio law); Andrews, 761 N.E.2d at 1080 (citing
Fred Siegel, 650 N.E.2d at para. 1 of syllabus). Prior to Fred Siegel and Kenty, some courts
placed the burden of proof on the interferer. E.g., Carman v. Entner, No. 13978, 1994 Ohio
App. LEXIS 387, at *23 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County Feb. 2, 1994) (“[T]he burden of
proving the defense of a privilege to interfere clearly rests with the defendant.”).
81

See infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.

82

Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (noting
that the improper element “is not well-defined by Ohio courts”).
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Court has explained that the impropriety of a defendant’s actions is fact specific and
determined “‘under the circumstances.’”83 That standard fails to notify defendants
whether their conduct is improper, resulting in unnecessary litigation. How the law
should provide clearer guidelines to would-be interferers is discussed below.
The seven-factor balancing test of section 767 of Restatement (Second) of Torts
applies: (1) to all contracts not terminable at the will of the parties; and (2) to
business relationships and contracts that are terminable at will when the plaintiff and
defendant do not compete.
The seven factors of section 767 are:
1. the nature of the actor’s conduct;
2. the actor’s motive;
3. the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes;
4. the interests sought to be advanced by the actor;
5. the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and
the contractual interests of the other;
6. the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference;
and
7. the relations between the parties.84
Of the seven factors, “[t]he nature of the [defendant’s] conduct” is the “chief
factor.”85
The application of the competitor’s privilege of section 768 of Restatement
(Second) of Torts is limited to a “contract that is terminable at will” or a business
relationship where the plaintiff and interferer compete.86 Competition exists when
“two or more commercial interests [seek] to obtain the same business from third
parties.”87 Under section 768, a defendant has a privilege to compete if:

83

Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 858 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b
(1979)).
84

Id. at 860 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979)). Prior to Fred
Siegel, many Ohio courts determined the existence of a privilege by applying the five-factor
test set forth in Juhasz v. Quik Shops, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit
County 1977): “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the nature of the expectancy with
which his conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the parties, (d) the interest sought to be
advanced by the actor[,] and (e) the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one
hand and the actor’s freedom of action on the other hand.” (internal quotation marks omitted).
This five-factor test is almost identical to Section 767; thus, the cases where courts analyzed
the existence of a privilege pursuant to the Juhasz factors are applicable to a Section 767
analysis.
85

Super Sulky, 174 F.3d at 742 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c
(1977)); Hicks v. Bryan Med. Group, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 795, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (citing
Super Sulky, 174 F.3d at 742).
86
Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 860 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979));
Cannon Group, Inc. v. Better Bags, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979)).
87

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (7th ed. 1999).
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1.

the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the
actor and the other[;] and
2. the actor does not employ wrongful means[;] and
3. his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade[;]
and
4. his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with
the other.88
Unlike section 767 (which sets forth a balancing test), the fair competition
privilege of section 768 purports to provide a defendant-competitor with a safe
harbor when its four prongs are satisfied.89 If the fair competition privilege is
inapplicable, then the balancing test of section 767 applies (and vice-versa).90
To determine what conduct is improper and unprivileged, Ohio courts should
consider whether the breached or terminated interest is a contract not terminable at
will, a contract terminable at will, or a business relationship. Ohio law should afford
greater protection to non-at-will contracts against outside interference than it does to
less binding business relationships and at-will contracts.91 Before addressing how
courts construe the improper element and before setting forth proposed standards to
Ohio interference law, this Article discusses when a contract is not terminable at will
or is terminable at will.
A. Contracts and Business Relationships That Are Terminable At Will and
Contracts That Are Not Terminable At Will
Classifying a contract or business relationship as terminable at will or not
terminable at will should determine whether a defendant acts improperly and without
a privilege.
1. When Is a Contract Terminable At Will?
Contracts without a specific duration of time are generally terminable at will.92
Either party to an at-will contract may be terminate it “at any time and for any
reason” (i.e., without good or just cause),93 as long as the reason “is not contrary to

88

Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 861 n.1 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 768(1) (1979)) (emphasis added); Cannon Group, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 903-04 (same).
Roughly only fifteen Ohio courts have cited to the competitor’s privilege of Section 768 or its
comments, and fewer courts have construed this section.
89

In practice, the competitor’s privilege does not, and should not, provide defendants with
broad protections on the sole basis that the plaintiff and defendant compete. See infra Part
V.A.3. The law should protect a competitor with a non-at-will agreement from tortious
interference from its competitors who have economic incentives to interfere.
90

Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 860-61 (“The specific applications in [Section 768] supplant
the generalization expressed in [Section 767].” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 767 cmt. a (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91

See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.

92

Miller v. Wikel Mfg. Co., 545 N.E.2d 76, 79 (Ohio 1989) (“[A] distributorship
agreement with no express provision as to duration is generally terminable at will.”).
93

Lake Land Employment Group of Akron v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ohio 2004).
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law.”94 Ohio courts presume that employment relationships are terminable at the will
of either the employer or employee, unless the “parties have specifically agreed
otherwise.”95 Contracts, though, containing a specific duration of time or a time
frame for performance, are not terminable at will, but terminable only for good
cause.96
Whether a contract is considered terminable at will for purposes of a claim of
tortious interference is not always an easy issue. At a minimum, an at-will contract
is one that is terminable at the will of both parties. At-will contracts include
contracts that permit both parties to terminate them for any reason with thirty days
advance notice.97 Only one Ohio court, in Wagoner v. Leach Co.,98 has analyzed a
contract terminable at the will of only one party in the context of a tortious
interference claim.
In Wagoner, the plaintiff-dealer could terminate its
distributorship agreement with the third-party manufacturer for any reason with
thirty days notice, but the manufacturer needed good cause to terminate the
agreement.99 The manufacturer breached the agreement, and the dealer asserted an
interference claim against the interferer. Wagoner ruled that the dealer agreement
was not terminable at will because the agreement required the breaching
manufacturer to have good cause to terminate it; thus, the competitor’s privilege of
section 768 of Restatement (Second) of Torts (which applies only to at-will
agreements) was “inapplicable.”100 Wagoner is consistent with other courts that have

94

Haynes v. Zoological Soc’y, 652 N.E.2d 948, 951 (Ohio 1995).

95

Dorricott v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging, 2 F. Supp. 2d 982, 991 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (citation
omitted); accord Hawley v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 445, 459 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(same standard).
96
Energy Mktg. Servs. v. Homer Laughlin China Co., 186 F.R.D. 369, 371, 374 (S.D.
Ohio 1999) (ruling that agreement “constitute[d] an enforceable contract” where the
agreement provided, in part, that it would be renewed annually, unless “a party gave the other
sixty days written termination notice”); Absolute Mach. Tools v. Southwest Indus. Sales, No.
04CA008611, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3625, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Lorain County Aug. 3,
2005) (finding that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to plaintiff; plaintiff
“established the existence of a binding contract” where plaintiff agreed to sell, and defendant
agreed to buy, machinery for a set price).
97
Doe v. Lodi Cmty. Hosp., No. 2955-M, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5802, at *23-24 (Ohio
Ct. App. Medina County Dec. 13, 2000) (finding that the plaintiff’s contract was “an at-will
contract”); Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assocs., 662 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1995) (applying the competitor’s privilege of Section 767 and concluding that the
“agreement . . . was terminable at-will with thirty days’ notice”).
98

No. 17580, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3152 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County July 2,
1999).
99

Id. at *4, *43 (manufacturer “was only able to terminate the contract after it found
deficiencies and gave [dealer] the opportunity to cure them”).
100
Id. at *43. Outside of the interference context, at least one non-Ohio court has ruled
that a contract terminable at the will of only one party was a non-at-will contract. Bugglin v.
CPC Int’l Inc., No. 91-2735, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12103, at *2, *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1992)
(“[T]he distributor’s agreement is not terminable at will” since the contract could be
terminated by wholesaler only for “just cause” but by the distributor for any reason.).
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concluded that employment contracts are not terminable at will when the employer,
but not employee, must have good cause to terminate the contract.101
Although not directly stated by Wagoner, the proper focus for whether a contract
is terminable at will is the contractual expectancy of the plaintiff, the injured party.
Under such an analysis, a contract may be at will for one party but not the other
party. In Wagoner, the contract was not terminable at will because the plaintiffdealer had the expectation that the third-party manufacturer (which could terminate
the agreement only for good cause) would abide by the terms of the distributorship
agreement. The binding nature of the agreement on the manufacturer provided the
dealer with a legal right to future relations and not only an expectancy. Had the
situation been reversed—the manufacturer could terminate the agreement for any
reason but not the dealer—then the dealer would have had no legal expectation that
the manufacturer would continue with the relationship. Under that situation, a court
applying Wagoner should conclude that the agreement was terminable at will as to
the dealer.
2. Protection Afforded to Contracts and Business Relationships That Are
Terminable At to Will and Contracts That Are Not Terminable At Will
Under Ohio tortious interference law, at-will agreements and business
relationships should receive (and deserve) less protection against outside interference
than non-at-will contracts.102 The binding nature of a contract and the objective
expectation of a future relationship between parties should determine when actions
are improper under the seven-factor test of section 767 and the competitor’s privilege
of section 768. Ohio courts agree that parties to at-will contracts and business
relationships have “no legal interest . . . but only an expectancy of continued
relations”: “‘[A]ny interference with [an at-will contract] that induces its termination
is primarily an interference with the future relation between the parties, and the
plaintiff has no legal assurance of them. As for the future hopes, [a plaintiff] has no
legal right but only an expectancy.’”103 Parties to contracts that are not terminable at

101

Golem v. Village of Put-In-Bay, 222 F. Supp. 2d 924, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(granting employee’s motion for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim;
employment handbook containing “very specific requirements for employment and discipline”
“alter[ed] the at-will nature of the employment”); Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468,
472 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1992) (upholding jury finding that employer violated the
employment handbook; handbook set forth “specific and mandatory” discipline procedures
that applied only to the employer, which rendered the employment not at will).
102
Tata Consultancy Servs. v. Sys. Int’l, Inc., 31 F.3d 416, 427 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying
Michigan law; explaining that at-will contracts are “deserving of less protection . . . than
enforceable bilateral contracts” (citing Kand Med., Inc. v. Freund Med. Prods., Inc., 963 F.2d
125 (6th Cir. 1992))).
103

Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assos., 662 N.E.2d 1088, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. i (1979)) (ruling that
summary judgment for interferer was proper) (first and third alternation added; second
alternation in original; emphasis added); accord Thomson v. Deaconess Hosp. of Cincinnati,
No. C-980257, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 541, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County Feb. 19,
1999) (applying standard set forth in Hoyt to a contract terminable at will and affirming the
grant of a directed verdict for defendant).
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will, however, have a “legal right” to future performance from the other party.104
Under a non-at-will contract, in contrast to an at-will contract or business
relationship, a plaintiff has a “greater definiteness of the other’s expectancy” and a
“stronger claim to security.”105 Ohio has a strong interest in preserving the “sanctity
of contractual relations”106 and enforcing contracts not terminable at will:107 “‘The
right to contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure according
to its terms is as fundamental to our society as the right to write and to speak without
restraint.’”108
Although not addressed directly by Ohio courts, a plaintiff’s expectation that the
other party to a non-at-will contract will abide by its terms should entitle that
contract to more protection against a defendant’s interference than a business
relationship or at-will contract. Providing broader protection to contracts not
terminable at will is logically consistent with Ohio law—that parties to at-will
agreements and business relationships have no “legal assurance” of an ongoing
relationship, but parties to non-at-will contracts do have such an assurance. The
seven factors of section 767 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Supreme
Court of Ohio has adopted, affords heightened protection to non-at-will contracts.
Section 767 explains that an act that induces a termination of a business relationship
may be privileged, but the same act may be improper if it induces the “breach of an
existing contract.”109 Other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have
concluded that the range of conduct that is improper is more narrow for the
termination of an at-will contract or business relationship than for the breach or
termination of a non-at-will contract.110 Requiring more culpable conduct for the
104

Miller v. Pennitech Indus. Tools, Inc., No. 2356-M, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1622, at
*14 (Ohio Ct. App. Medina County Apr. 19, 1995) (explaining that if the employment
agreement was not terminable at will the plaintiff would have had a “legal right” to enforce it
against the third party).
105

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. e (1979).

106

Blakeman’s Valley Office Equip., Inc. v. Bierdeman, 786 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mahoning County 2003) (weighing the public interest factor and ruling that the trial
court should have issued a preliminary injunction); Mike McGarry & Sons, Inc. v. Gross, No.
86603, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1620, at *14-16 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Apr. 6,
2006) (setting forth same proposition as Blakeman’s and upholding issuance of a preliminary
injunction).
107
Escape Enters., Ltd. v. Gosh Enters., Inc., Nos. 04AP-834, 04AP-857, 2005 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2466, at *12-13, *31-32 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County May 26, 2005) (explaining
that the interest of the public favored the enforcement of the contract and upholding the
issuance of a preliminary injunction to plaintiff on its claim that defendant tortiously interfered
with its non-at-will contract).
108

Wallace v. Balint, 761 N.E.2d 598, 604 (Ohio 2002) (quoting Blount v. Smith, 231
N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967)).
109

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmts. e & j (1979) (providing that
“permissible interference is given a broader scope” for a business relationship than an
“existing contract”).
110

NBT Bancorp, Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 664 N.E.2d 492, 496 (N.Y. 1996)
(“Where there has been no breach of an existing contract, but only interference with
prospective contract rights, however, plaintiff must show more culpable conduct on the part of
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interference with an at-will contract or business relationship than a non-at-will
contract appropriately balances “‘society’s interest in respect for the integrity of
contractual [and business] relationships, [with] . . . the right to freedom of action on
the part of the party interfering and society’s concern that competition not be unduly
hampered.’”111
To illustrate the rule that contracts terminable at will deserve less protection from
outside interference than non-at-will contracts, recall the Sleepy/Wake-Up
Hypothetical. Traitor Tom (Sleepy’s former employee) caused three of Sleepy’s
customers to terminate their at-will business relationships with Sleepy, and Wake-Up
(Sleepy’s competitor) induced Traitor Tom to breach his non-competition agreement
(a contract not terminable at will). Because Sleepy had no legal assurance of a future
relationship with its customers but had a legal right to bind Traitor Tom to his twoyear agreement, Traitor Tom’s actions sould have to be more culpable than
Wake-Up’s actions to be improper.
3. At-Will Contracts and Business Relationships: The Effect
of Competition on Whether Conduct Is Improper
The mere fact that the parties compete should not transform unprivileged actions
into privileged actions.112 Rather, the key inquiries should be whether the breached
or terminated interest is an at-will contract or business relationship and whether
improper means were used to induce the breach or termination.113 The competitor’s
privilege of section 768 of Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to at-will contracts
and business relationships where a plaintiff and defendant are in competition. On its
face, the fair competition privilege purports to provide a safe harbor to competitors,
providing that a competitor “does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation
if” its four prongs are met.114 Some courts have construed that provision to be an
absolute safe harbor for an interferer who induces the termination of an at-will
contract or business relationship, as long as the interferer acts, in part, to compete
with the plaintiff.115
the defendant.”); Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1987) (“[T]he extent of
permissible third-party interference increases as the degree of enforceability of a business
relationship decreases.”).
111
NBT Bancorp, 664 N.E.2d at 496 (quoting Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg.
Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1980)).
112

Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 818 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (N.Y. 2004) (explaining that it was
irrelevant whether the court classifies plaintiffs and defendant as “‘competitors’”; “the
question . . . is whether the ‘means’ employed . . . were ‘wrongful’ or ‘culpable’”).
113

See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.

114

See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the four prongs of the
competitor’s privilege).
115

E.g., Chem-A-Co., Inc. v. Earth Science Labs., Inc., No. 4:04CV0015, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66798, at *10-11, *11 n.1, *13 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2006) (granting interferer’s motion
for summary judgment where interferer “was acting, at least in part, to compete with
[counterclaimant] and promote its own legitimate business interests”; explaining that between
competitors “the mere existence of a legitimate business interest will provide justification” for
interference); Economation, Inc. v. Automated Conveyor Sys., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 553, 562
(S.D. Ind. 1988) (“[J]ustification for the defendant’s conduct was competition.”).
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The express language of the competitor’s privilege and Ohio courts’
interpretation of that privilege, however, support the rule that whether conduct is
privileged should not hinge solely on whether a plaintiff and defendant compete but
on whether the relationship is at will. First, to fall within the fair competition
privilege of section 768, a defendant must compete with a plaintiff and must “not
employ wrongful means.”116 Under Ohio law, even if competition exists, a
competitor-interferer does not escape liability when it uses “wrongful means.”117
Second, no Ohio court has expressly ruled that a defendant may avail itself of more
extensive privileges on the sole basis that the defendant is a competitor, and one
court has implicitly rejected such a contention.118 Third, prior to Ohio’s adoption of
the competitor’s privilege of section 768 in April 1999,119 some courts analyzed a
defendant’s right to compete by weighing the factors set forth in Juhasz v. Quik
Shops, Inc.120—the same factors used to determine whether conduct between noncompetitors is improper.121 Even after the adoption of the fair competition privilege,
Ohio courts have not applied the Juhasz factors or section 767 to at-will contracts
and business relationships involving competition.122
Competition, however, does play a role in tortious interference law. Whether a
plaintiff and interferer compete is relevant to the strength of the interferer’s evidence
that its conduct was privileged. Because competitors seek revenues from the same or
similar customers, competition provides an economic basis and motive for a
defendant’s interference with its competitors’ business relationships. In contrast,
when parties are not competitors, it is more likely that an interferer was motivated by

116

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1)(a)-(1)(b) (1979).

117
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 861 (Ohio 1999) (construing the
fair competition privilege and ruling that the interferer would be liable if it “used information
acquired through improper means in their competitive efforts, e.g., information protected as
trade secrets” (emphasis added)); Prof’l Balance Co. v. Fulton & Assocs. Balance, No. 97-L238, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1692, at *16-17 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County Apr. 16, 1999)
(noting that where plaintiff and defendant competed, defendant’s conduct would have been
improper had he breached a fiduciary duty); see Soderlud Bros. v. Carrier Corp., 663 N.E.2d
1, 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“Acts of competition which are never privileged include fraud,
deceit, intimidation or deliberate disparagement.”).
118

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(rejecting defendant-competitor’s argument that “any act of interference that it did commit
was privileged” under section 768).
119

Fred Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 861.

120

Juhasz v. Quik Shops, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County 1977); see
supra note 84 (setting forth the five Juhasz factors).
121

See, e.g., Dineen Enters. v. Patrick, No. 12732, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6707, at *7-8
(Ohio Ct. App. Summit County May 6, 1987) (construing the five factors in Juhasz).
122

M.J. McPherson Servs., L.L.P. v. Sports Images, Inc., No. 5:06 CV 465, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60879, at *11-12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2006) (setting forth the seven factors of Section
767); Kenneth J. Majcen & Assocs. v. Phoenix Assocs., No. 76454, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS
140, at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Jan. 18, 2001) (not citing Section 768); Bailey v.
Lake Erie Educ. Computer Ass’n, Nos. 99CA007323, 99CA007471, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
5160, at *9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Lorain County Nov. 8, 2000) (applying Juhasz factors).
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something other than economic competition, such as ill will toward a plaintiff.123
Suppose a plaintiff’s interference claim against a non-competitor is based on the
non-competitor’s false statements. A jury is more likely to find that the noncompetitor acted with an intent to harm the plaintiff and made the statements with
knowledge of their falsity if the non-competitor cannot claim competition as a basis
for the interference.
B. Application of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 767 (Seven-Factor
Balancing Test) and Section 768 (Competitor’s Privilege)
Under the seven-factor test of section 767 and the competitor’s privilege of
section 768 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, courts determine what constitutes
improper conduct by placing claims for tortious interference into three categories:
(1) at-will contracts or business relationships involving no competition between the
plaintiff and defendant (section 767 applies); (2) at-will contracts and business
relationships involving a matter of competition between the plaintiff and defendant
(section 768 applies); and (3) non-at-will contracts, regardless of whether the
plaintiff and defendant are competitors (section 767 applies). Part V.B.1 discusses
what actions are improper or privileged under current Ohio law. Part V.B.1.b argues
that Ohio law should be modified with a bright-line rule for determining improper
conduct for the termination of at-will contracts and business relationships. Part
V.B.2 argues that Ohio courts should clarify what is improper for the inducement of
a breach or termination of a contract not terminable at will.
1. At-Will Contracts and Business Relationships: What Is Improper Conduct Under
Ohio Law
Ohio courts have failed to define a sufficient range of conduct that is improper
and unprivileged in the context of contracts terminable at will and business
relationships, and even fewer courts have ruled as a matter of law on what constitutes
improper conduct. For the interference with an at-will contract or a business
relationship, the following actions are improper under Ohio law: (1) using or
disclosing confidential information or trade secrets;124 (2) making false or misleading
statements with malice;125 (3) breaching a fiduciary duty;126 (4) committing fraud or
123
Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 818 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (N.Y. 2004) (stating that in the
absence of competition, “there may be a stronger case that the defendant’s interference with
the plaintiff’s relationships was motivated by spite”).
124
M.J. McPherson Servs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60879, at *12-13 (concluding that the
complaint failed to alleged improper conduct because there were no trade secrets disclosed,
the only basis of plaintiff’s interference claim); see infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
125

See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text; see also Bearing Distributs., Inc. v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 06-cv-831, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67327, at *1, *29-30
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss claim for interference with a business
relationship; plaintiff pled improper conduct by alleging that interferer “falsely informed
[plaintiff’s] customers that [plaintiff] is substituting parts manufactured in China for other
products specified by customers, without the customers knowledge or consent”) (citation
omitted); Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Sai Baba, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 2d 583, 594-95 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (franchisees’ claim that franchisor engaged in a “misrepresentation” was a sufficient
allegation of “improper” conduct); Cooper v. Jones, No. 05CA7, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS
1606, at *16-17 (Ohio Ct. App. Jackson County Mar. 29, 2006) (finding that defendant’s
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physical violence;127 (5) instituting a civil or criminal action in bad faith (i.e., for
purposes other than litigating the claim on the merits);128 (6) abusing process of the
judicial system;129 and (7) acting with an intent to harm a plaintiff.130
When a plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with a business relationship is
based on false or misleading statements and the statements are defamatory, a plaintiff
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the statements
“with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that the statements are false or with
statements that plaintiff was a “liar” and “cheat” were sufficient to create a material issue of
fact as to the propriety of defendant’s conduct).
126

Prof’l Balance Co. v. Fulton & Assocs. Balance, No. 97-L-238, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS
1692, at *16-17 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County Apr. 16, 1999) (applying the competitor’s
privilege of Section 768; had the jury determined that defendant-employee breached a
fiduciary duty in soliciting plaintiff’s employees (who were defendant’s former coworkers)
then such conduct would have fallen outside of Section 768 and been improper).
127
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 767 cmt. c, 768 cmts. e & g (1979). The
Supreme Court of Ohio has cited comment c to Section 767 with approval. Fred Siegel Co. v.
Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 860 (Ohio 1999).

The elements for a claim of fraud are “(1) a representation or, where there is a duty to
disclose, concealment, (2) which is material, (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard for the truth, (4) with the intent to mislead, (5) justifiable reliance upon
the representation or concealment, and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the
justifiable reliance.” Padgett v. Sanders, 719 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Ohio Ct. App. Clermont
County 1998).
128

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 767 cmt. c, 768 cmt. e (1979).

To prove a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: “(1)
malicious institution of prior proceedings against the plaintiff by defendant, . . . (2) lack of
probable cause for the filing of the prior lawsuit, . . . (3) termination of the prior proceedings
in plaintiff’s favor, . . . and (4) seizure of plaintiff’s person or property during the course of the
prior proceedings.” Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, 662 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ohio 1996)
(quoting Crawford v. Euclid Nat’l Bank, 483 N.E.2d 1168 (Ohio 1985)).
129

Gray-Jones v. Jones, 738 N.E.2d 64, 71 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 2000)
(explaining that committing the tort of abuse of process to interfere with another’s business
relations is improper).
A claim for the tort of abuse of process requires a showing of three elements: “(1) that a
legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) that the
proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was
not designed; and (3) that direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.”
Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 626 N.E.2d 115, syllabus ¶ 1 (Ohio 1994)
(emphasis added).
130

See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 768 cmt. g (1979); Coal Processing Equip., Inc. v. Campbell, 578 F. Supp. 445, 46467 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (finding, after a bench trial, that defendant lacked a privilege to act by
sending letters to plaintiff’s clients claiming that plaintiff was infringing defendant’s patent;
the letters, which lacked any basis, were “intended to injure [plaintiff’s] business” and sent
with “ill will and vindictiveness” toward plaintiff); Madorsky v. Bernstein, 626 N.E.2d 694,
696-97 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga Cty. 1993) (applying Juhasz factors; affirming summary
judgment in favor of defendant because plaintiff produced no evidence that defendant “acted
in bad faith”).
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reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.”131 A reckless disregard means the
defendant “had a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the published
statements . . .”;132 it is more than mere negligence.133 A showing of malice creates
an issue of fact on whether an interferer’s statement was privileged.134 Indeed, a
plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff establishes that an
interferer made a false statement recklessly. In the Matter of Gettys,135 the
defendant-attorney persuaded a competitor’s client to terminate her relationship with
plaintiff-attorney. Defendant did so by falsely telling the client that she would not be
responsible for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees if she hired defendant while the bankruptcy
proceeding was pending.136 Gettys granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
ruling that defendant “employed ‘wrongful means’ when he [made]
misrepresent[ations] [regarding client’s fee] obligation” to the plaintiff.137 Without
evidence of actual malice, however, a claim for tortious interference with a business
relationship will fail.138

131
A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
651 N.E.2d 1283, 1295 (Ohio 1995); accord Licul v. Swagelok Co., No. 86322, 2006 Ohio
App. LEXIS 619, at *12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Feb. 16, 2006) (construing
Section 767 and upholding jury verdict for defendant because jury found no malice); Doyle v.
Fairfield Mach. Co., 697 N.E.2d 667, 683-84 (Ohio Ct. App. Trumbull County 1997) (finding
that the jury instruction requiring the statements to be made with actual malice was proper for
claim that defendant interfered with plaintiff’s employment). Malice “does not require the
showing of ill-will or hatred for the plaintiff . . . .” Andrews v. Carmody, 761 N.E.2d 1076,
1081 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County 2001).
132
Jacobs v. Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ohio 1991) (citing Duplere v. Mansfield Journal,
413 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 1985)).
133

Kremer v. Cox, 682 N.E.2d 1006, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County 1996).

134

Barilla v. Patella, 760 N.E.2d 898, 904-05 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 2001)
(finding an issue of fact as to actual malice where defendant testified that his defamatory
statements were true and then later testified that those statements “were not true”).
135
205 B.R. 515 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Surprisingly, Gettys is the only Ohio court that has
granted a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on a claim for tortious interference.
136

Id. at 517-18, 519, 522-23.

137

Id. at 522 & n.4, 525 (construing the fair competition privilege under Section 768).
Gettys did not specifically address whether defendant made the misrepresentations with at
least a reckless disregard as to the falsity of his statements. The court, though, implicitly
found that defendant acted recklessly; it emphasized that attorneys like defendant are
“presumed to know the law.” Id. at 524.
138
A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
651 N.E.2d 1283, 1294-95 (Ohio 1995) (affirming the grant of a directed verdict for defendant
because no evidence of malice for claim of interference with prospective business
relationship); Rizvi v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mahoning County 2001) (affirming the award of summary judgment in favor of defendantphysician; statements in report that plaintiff-doctor was “unsatisfactory in terms of ethics and
honesty” were privileged because “a report supported by a finding of an administrative board
does not reach the point of actual malice”); Smith v. Ameriflora 1992, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 1038,
1040-41, 1044 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1994) (finding that without evidence of
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A plaintiff may defeat an interferer’s motion for summary judgment by setting
forth evidence of any conduct falling within categories (1) through (7) discussed
above.139 For instance, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Fred Siegel Co., v. Arter &
Hadden140 construed the competitor’s privilege and reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant-attorney.141 Plaintiff-firm contended that
its former attorney used confidential information to solicit plaintiff’s clients.142 Fred
Siegel explained: “The evidence is ambiguous as to whether [defendant] used
information acquired through improper means in [her] competitive efforts, e.g.,
information protected as trade secrets, or information as to [plaintiff’s] fee
arrangements with clients that may have been wrongfully disclosed.”143
Additionally, Ohio courts have denied summary judgment to an interferer where the
sole evidence of unprivileged conduct was that the interferer had an intent to harm
the plaintiff.144 Evidence of a third party’s legitimate reason for terminating a
business relationship does not negate a defendant’s ill-will toward a plaintiff.145

malice, summary judgment for defendant was appropriate). None of these courts cited either
section 767 or 768.
139

See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.

140

707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).

141

Id. at 861 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979)).

142

Id. at 853-54.

143

Id. at 861 (emphasis added).

144

Hicks v. Bryan Med. Group, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 795, 801, 812-13 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(denying defendant-hospital’s motion for summary judgment because evidence of ill-will
toward plaintiff was sufficient under Section 767; defendant’s actions, which resulted in the
termination of plaintiff-physician’s at-will agreement with his practice group, may have been
motivated by ill-will toward plaintiff and not to ensure quality medical care); Petrovski v. Fed.
Express Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 685, 689, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (applying Section 767;
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment where there was a factual dispute regarding
whether defendant’s statement, “plaintiff ‘had got what he deserved’” (in referring to the
termination of plaintiff’s at-will employment relationship), evidenced an intent to harm
plaintiff); Edified Developers, Inc. v. Gillombardo’s Broadview, Inc., No. 59674, 1992 Ohio
App. LEXIS 9, at *2-5, *11-13 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Jan. 2, 1992) (applying
Juhasz factors; trial court erred in granting summary judgment to interferer because the jury
could have found that the interferer acted not to “enhance its own economic well-being,” but
to harm the other party).
145
Miller v. Pennitech Indus. Tools, Inc., No. 2356-M, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1622, at
*19-21 (Ohio Ct. App. Medina County Apr. 19, 1995) (finding that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of interferer because evidence that third party acted to
advance its economic interests does not negate defendant’s conduct).

Acting with an intent to harm, without more, should be privileged conduct. Ohio courts’
rulings to the contrary were wrongly decided. Assume that two interferers commit the same
act to induce a termination of a business relationship, and one of the interferers has an intent to
harm the plaintiff. The fact that one interferer acted with ill-will does not make it more or less
likely that the act will induce the third party to terminate the business relationship. Thus, this
type of conduct does not further the purpose of tortious interference -- to protect parties from
outside interference.
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In the majority of cases involving claims of tortious interference with a business
relationship, the defendant prevails.146 Certain actions under Ohio law that cause the
termination of an at-will contract or a business relationship are per se privileged: (1)
soliciting and hiring the at-will employees of another employer;147 (2) acting in good
faith to protect a defendant’s economic interest;148 (3) making true statements of fact
or statements of opinion, even if defamatory;149 and (4) acting in accordance with an
express provision in the plaintiff’s contract with defendant.150 When a defendant’s
actions fall within those per se categories, an interference claim fails.
Defendants are privileged to solicit and hire the employees of another employer,
as long as the employees have employment agreements terminable at will and the
defendant does not commit an act falling in the improper categories (1) to (7) above.
Under such circumstances, Ohio courts grant (or uphold) summary judgment in favor
of defendants.151 For instance, offering an at-will employee a higher wage rate or
more benefits than the employee’s former employer “to induce . . . the employee . . .
to terminate an at-will employment relationship” is privileged conduct.152 Like atwill employees, a defendant may solicit and lure away a plaintiff’s customers, so
long as the customers and plaintiff have no non-at-will contract and the defendant
146

See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.

147

See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.

148

See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

149

See infra note 155 and accompanying text.

150

See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.

151

R.G. Eng’g & Mfg. v. Rance, No. 01-CO-12, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5264, at *1, *1920 (Ohio Ct. App. Columbiana County Sept. 25, 2002) (“[N]o genuine issue of material fact
remains as to [plaintiffs’] claims for tortious interference with contract and business relations”;
plaintiff’s former employees who started working for defendant “were [not] bound by noncompetition agreements.”); Tool Steel Prods. Sales Corp. v. XTEK, Inc., No. C-910533, 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 333, at *1-2, *10 & n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County Jan. 29, 1993)
(affirming the issuance of summary judgment in favor of defendant; defendant hired two
employees who worked for plaintiff in “a strictly at-will relationship, with no fixed term of
employment” and such conduct was privileged); see Willis Refrigeration, Air Conditioning &
Heating, Inc. v. Maynard, No. CA99-05-047, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 102, at *2-3, *26 (Ohio
Ct. App. Clermont County Jan. 18, 2000) (finding that the trial court properly denied motion
for a preliminary injunction; by soliciting at-will employees of plaintiff, defendant “was
privileged by the advancement of a bona fide business interest” by employing lawful means).
152

Propper Demonstration Sales of Ohio, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., No. 1:88CV4149,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20896, at *5-6, *17-18 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 1999) (granting summary
judgment to defendant-employer where defendant solicited plaintiff’s employee and paid the
former employee $4.00 per hour more than plaintiff; “it is not improper interference” to
induce the termination of an at-will relationship); Reagan v. Ranger Transp., Inc., No. 97-P0102, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5824, at *2, *3-4, *15-19 (Ohio Ct. App. Portage County Dec.
4, 1998) (finding that summary judgment in favor of defendants was proper; defendants acted
within their privilege under section 767 where they set up a meeting with plaintiff’s
employees, used “public information” about plaintiff, and hired seven of plaintiff’s
employees; evidence showed that the seven employees “left [plaintiff] for Ranger in pursuit of
a better compensation package, not as the result of any improper conduct” by defendants).
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does not use trade secrets or confidential information contained in a customer list.153
Under those circumstances, Ohio courts award (or uphold) summary judgment for a
defendant when the defendant acts to promote its economic interest, even if the
defendant has actual knowledge of the third party’s business relationship.154
Further, true statements and statements of opinion entitle a defendant to summary
judgment on a claim for interference with a business relationship.155 Another
example of per se privileged conduct is an act that is expressly permitted by a
contract between a plaintiff and defendant. In Franklin Tractor Sales v. New
Holland North America, Inc.,156 plaintiff sold equipment manufactured by
defendant.157 Defendant implemented a new program where it began selling
equipment directly to customers, including plaintiff’s customers.158 The Sixth

153

M.J. McPherson Servs., L.L.P. v. Sports Images, Inc., No. 5:06 CV 465, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60879, at *1-3, *11-13 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2006) (applying OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
and dismissing a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship where defendant
successfully solicited at least one of plaintiff’s customer by using plaintiff’s customer list;
ruling that complaint failed to allege that defendant “acted improperly” because defendant did
not disclose a trade secret or use the customer list unlawfully).
154

Cannon Group, Inc. v. Better Bags, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903-04 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(construing section 768 and granting summary judgment for defendant; defendant “did not
employ any wrongful means” by negotiating with third parties with knowledge of their at-will
contracts with plaintiff and offering them a “better deal” than plaintiff); Busch v. Premier
Integrated Med. Assocs., No. 19364, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4255, at *1-2, *19-23 (Ohio Ct.
App. Montgomery County Sept. 5, 2003) (interpreting section 768; summary judgment for
defendant appropriate where defendant-medical group “pursue[d] [its] economic opportunities
to [its] maximum benefit” in competing with plaintiff); Northeast Ohio College of
Massotheraphy v. Burek, 759 N.E.2d 869, 872, 879-80 (Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning County
2001) (applying section 768 and affirming award of summary judgment in favor of
defendants; defendants’ solicitation of students from plaintiff-school (its competitor) was done
“to advance their competitive interest in the massotherapy education services” and was not
prohibited by any prior arrangement between the parties); Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assocs.,
662 N.E.2d 1088, 1095-97 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1995) (affirming summary
judgment under Section 768; defendants were privileged to compete with plaintiff because
they employed no “‘wrongful means’ by . . . exert[ing] economic pressure” on the plaintiff’s
former business partner; defendants acted to advance their business interests).
155
Rizvi v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning
County 2001) (affirming the grant of summary judgment to one of the defendant-physicians
because his statement was “an expression of opinion and not subject to liability”); El-Shiekh
v. Nw. State Cardiology Consultants, No. L-99-1380, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4143, at *14-16
(Ohio Ct. App. Lucas County Sept. 15, 2000) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
because its statement was “privileged and true”; explaining that truthful statements are “a
complete defense to tortious interference where the underlying claim is based upon allegations
of defamatory statements”); Dryden v. Cincinnati Bell Tel., 734 N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ohio Ct.
App. Hamilton Ciunty 1999) (ruling that summary judgment in favor of defendant was
appropriate because co-workers were privileged to convey “truthful information” to plaintiff’s
supervisor) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979)).
156

106 F.App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2004) (construing Section 767 under Ohio law).

157

Id. at 343.

158

Id.
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Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendant, explaining: “The
dealership agreements unquestionably allowed [defendant] to bypass [plaintiff] and
sell directly to customers . . . .”159
a. At-Will Contracts and Business Relationships: The Outer Limits of What
Constitutes Improper Conduct Is Unclear Under Ohio Law
Ohio courts have not expressly addressed how culpable an interferer’s actions
must be to defeat the privilege in the context of contracts terminable at will and
business relationships. They have implied that a defendant’s act may be
unprivileged without rising to the level of a crime or tort. Several courts have
concluded that conduct may be improper when an interferer acts with an intent to
harm a plaintiff, conduct that is not independently actionable.160 The Supreme Court
of Ohio has stated that “whether the interference is improper or not” under the sevenfactor balancing test is determined “under the circumstances.”161 On the other hand,
all actions that Ohio courts have considered to be improper (except acting with an
intent to harm) were either illegal or independently tortious.162
b. Proposed Modification to Ohio Law for At-Will Contracts and Business
Relationships: Conduct Must Be Independently Actionable to Be Improper and
Unprivileged
For inducing the termination of at-will agreements and business relationships,
Ohio should adopt the standard that a defendant’s conduct is privileged, unless the
defendant engages in independently actionable conduct (which is conduct that, by
itself, may form the basis of a criminal or civil action). Under this modification to
Ohio law, a defendant could cause the termination of an at-will contract or business
relationship without liability, as long as the defendant commits no act that would
subject the defendant to civil or criminal liability. This proposed standard furthers
the principle that courts should require an interferer’s conduct to be more culpable
for the interference with at-will contracts and business relationships (where parties
have only an expectancy of a future relationship) than non-at-will contracts (where
parties have a legal right to continued relations). As established below, the
independently actionable standard is consistent with many other jurisdictions
(jurisdictions that, like Ohio, have adopted the competitor’s privilege and the sevenfactor test), and it appropriately balances Ohio’s interest in protecting competition
and the freedom to act with the low future expectancy of parties to at-will
agreements and business relationships.
159
Id. at 346 (explaining that under the agreement, defendant “reserve[d] the right to sell
directly to eligible customers”); accord Bill Call Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 830 F. Supp.
1053, 1062-63 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (ruling that the Juhasz factor, the relation between the
parties, was of “paramount consideration” and granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant Ford; because the franchise agreement between plaintiff-dealer and defendant Ford
gave Ford the “right to pick and choose its successor franchisee” and to “counsel the
prospective successor [of plaintiff] on the price paid for [plaintiff’s] assets[,]” Ford acted
properly in doing so).
160

See cases cited supra note 144.

161

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999).

162

See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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To determine the impropriety of an interferer’s conduct, the independently
actionable standard requires the weighing of only one factor—whether civil or
criminal liability may attach to a defendant’s act; if so, then the interferer acted
without privilege. The determinative factor under the independently actionable
requirement is the third factor of section 767 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, “the
interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes” (i.e., whether the
breached or terminated interest was a non-at-will contract or an at-will contract or
business relationship), and is the second factor of section 768, “the actor does not
employ wrongful means.”163 Determining improper conduct on the basis of one
factor is consistent with Ohio courts, which have concluded that one factor of the
seven-factor test (section 767) and the competitor’s privilege (section 768) may be
dispositive on the issue of privilege.164
In the Sleepy–Wake-Up hypothetical, under current Ohio law and the
independently actionable standard, Sleepy’s interference claim against Traitor Tom
for soliciting Sleepy’s former customers would fail. Assuming that the lower price
offered by Traitor Tom to the former customers complied with the antitrust laws and
that Traitor Tom disclosed no confidential information, then his conduct is lawful
and privileged. On the other hand, if Sleepy establishes that Wake-Up’s false and
defamatory statements were made to Traitor Tom with malice, such statements
would form the basis of a defamation claim against Wake-Up. Thus, those
statements would constitute improper conduct under current Ohio law and the
proposed independently actionable standard.
The independently actionable requirement does not make a claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship duplicative of the underlying cause of
action. Under the proposed standard, tortious interference with a business
relationship may provide a plaintiff with a cause of action against a defendant who
would otherwise not be subject to liability to the plaintiff.165 Suppose before Traitor
Tom leaves Sleepy he is physically beaten by Bully Bill (a former employee whom
163
DP-TEK, Inc. v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 835 (10th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that “the wrongful means test of section 768 requires independently actionable
conduct”).
164

See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing Franklin Tractor Sales v.
New Holland N. Am., Inc., 106 F.App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2004), and Bill Call Ford, Inc., 830 F.
Supp. 1053, and explaining that these courts determined that the relations between the parties
was a dispositive factor).
165
The Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected an argument that the independently actionable
requirement would render this tort redundant. It explained:
[I]f Companies A and B are competing for a piece of lucrative business and A uses
violence against the employees of B to prevail, these employees could presumably sue
for battery. B’s damages for intentional interference with prospective advantage,
which depend in part on proof of the torts committed against its employees, would be
far larger, however.
DP-TEK, Inc. v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 835 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quoting San Francisco Design Ctr. of Cal. v. Portman Cos., 41 Cal. App. 4th 29, 42 n.9
(1995)); accord PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 992 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) (“Thus in many cases interference with contract is not so much a theory of
liability in itself as it is an element of damage resulting from the commission of some other
tort. . . .”).
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Sleepy recently terminated), resulting in Traitor Tom being unable to work for
Sleepy for five months. Further assume that Bully Bill had an intent to interfere and
that the non-competition agreement is invalid. Sleepy could prevail on a claim
against Bully Bill for tortious interference with a business relationship because Bully
Bill’s battery subjects him to civil liability to Traitor Tom. Without an interference
claim, Sleepy would have no tort cause of action against Bully Bill (only Traitor
Tom would have a claim against him).
i. Jurisdictions Outside of Ohio Have Adopted the Independently Actionable
Requirement
Many courts outside of Ohio have ruled that independently actionable conduct is
necessary for a finding of improper conduct.166 Each court adopting this standard
applied the law of a state that, like Ohio, has adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts or is guided by it for interference claims.167 Although those jurisdictions
adopted the independently actionable requirement in the context of competition, as
demonstrated above, competition itself does not justify a standard that transforms
otherwise unprivileged conduct into privileged conduct.168 Notably, the courts
adopting this standard did not limit their rulings to competitors. The independently
actionable standard, therefore, should apply to all at-will relationships, regardless of
whether there is direct competition.
ii. Public Policy Favors the Independently Actionable Standard
Modifying Ohio law to require conduct to be independently actionable for
liability to attach would promote good public policy. First, Ohio law must provide
166
These jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania. CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA
Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 388-89 (3d Cir. 2004) (construing section 768 under
Pennsylvania law and requiring conduct to be “independently actionable”); DP-TEK, 100 F.3d
at 835 (construing Kansas law; “the wrongful means test of section 768 requires independently
actionable conduct”); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1507 (8th Cir. 1992)
(applying Minnesota law; “wrongful” conduct under Section 768 means conduct that is “‘itself
capable of forming the basis for liability of the actor’” (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co.,
774 F.2d 895, 907 (8th Cir. 1985))); Arochem Int’l, Inc. v. Buirkle, 968 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir.
1992) (applying California and Connecticut law and concluding that conduct must be
independently actionable); Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532, 542 (7th
Cir. 1986) (explaining that Indiana law requires that the “‘defendant act[s] illegally’” (quoting
Biggs v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983))); San Francisco Design, 41 Cal.
App. 4th at 42-43 (stating that to defeat the privilege of competition, the defendant’s conduct
“must be unlawful or illegitimate” or “independently actionable”); Fordham v. Cole, Nos. 906563, 91-6861, 1993 Mass. Super. LEXIS 278, at *18-19 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 1993)
(requiring actions to be unlawful under section 768); Briner Elec. Co. v. Sachs Elec. Co., 680
S.W.2d 737, 741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“[C]ompetitive conduct which is neither illegal nor
independently actionable does not become actionable because it interferes with another’s
prospective contractual relations.”); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 818 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (N.Y.
2004) (stating that the general rule is that improper actions must “constitute a crime or an
independent tort”).
167

See supra note 166 (citing cases where courts adopted the independently actionable
requirement by construing the competitor’s privilege of section 768).
168

See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
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greater clarity to businesses located in Ohio as to what actions are privileged or
unprivileged, and the independently actionable standard provides the necessary
clarity. To their credit, Ohio courts have offered some guidance. They have
expressly determined that certain acts are per se not privileged (e.g., making
defamatory, false statements with malice, disclosing confidential information, and
committing fraud)169 and that some conduct is per se privileged (e.g., acting in
accordance with a specific provision in the third party’s contract).170 Nonetheless,
because improper conduct is not limited to unlawful conduct and because the
Supreme Court of Ohio applies the “under the circumstances” test,171 there are
numerous acts that could subject an Ohio business to liability for tortious
interference with a business relationship.172
Without clear guidelines, competition in Ohio is, and will continue to be,
hindered. A business, for instance, is likely not to commit a certain act to solicit the
customers of its competitors if the business is unsure whether the act is improper.
Suppose a business has an opportunity to obtain a customer list of its competitor,
and, if obtained, the business would send direct marketing information to those
customers about a new, low-priced product the business offers. If the business
cannot be reasonably certain that it may obtain that list and solicit the customers on
that list without being subject to a tortious interference claim, then the business
likely will refrain from doing so. Thus, the customers will not have complete
information about that product, and the customers will continue to purchase products
from the competitor, although the business’s new product may be better suited for
the customers. As Judge Easterbrook explained, when perfect information in the
marketplace is lacking, the economy is working inefficiently.173 Under the
independently actionable standard, the business likely would solicit the customers
because it could be reasonably certain that its actions are privileged.
Second, the independently actionable requirement protects the objective
expectations of parties. Parties to an at-will agreement or business relationships have
no legal expectation that the other will continue the relationship for a definite length
of time; however, at a minimum, they have a justified expectation that their
relationship would not be terminated based on the unlawful acts of a party or nonparty to the relationship. Although employees with at-will agreements have no
objective expectation of future employment, for example, they do have a legitimate
expectation not to be terminated for unlawful reasons,174 such as sexual or religious
169

See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.

170

See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.

171

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999).

172

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) offers little guidance. Section 767 sets
forth seven vague factors, and section 768 (the competitor’s privilege) shields an interferer
from liability only when “the actor does not employ wrongful means,” which section 768 fails
to define.
173

Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When markets are
informationally efficient, it is impossible to segment information [in the relevant market][;]
. . . only if the market is inefficient is partial [information] transmission likely . . . .”).
174

Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods., 760 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ohio 2002) (explaining that the
discharge of an at-will employee in violation of a statute “contravenes public policy”).
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discrimination.175 The independently actionable standard protects such employees’
expectations from the illegal acts of outsiders.
Third, the independently actionable requirement promotes competition (e.g.,
lower prices). When a defendant attempts to interfere with a plaintiff and third
party’s relationship by offering the third party a better “deal” than the plaintiff, in
contrast to interfering through unlawful acts, the third party is more likely to provide
the plaintiff with a reasonable opportunity to counter the offer made by the defendant
before the third party accepts defendant’s offer and terminates its relationship with
the plaintiff. Suppose that an automobile manufacturer has at-will agreements with
Dealer A and Dealer B and that a competing manufacturer approaches both dealers
in hopes that the Dealers will terminate their current agreements. The competitor
solicits Dealer A and B by offering them cheaper wholesale price, but the competitor
also makes false, defamatory statements to Dealer B that Dealer B’s current
manufacturer intends to replace Dealer B with a new dealer. Dealer A likely would
inform the automobile manufacturer about the competitor’s proposal to use as a
bargaining tool, and the manufacturer will have a reasonable opportunity to negotiate
a new price with Dealer A to maintain their relationship (where the competitor’s
actions were lawful). Dealer B, however, is likely to execute an agreement with the
competitor without first providing the manufacturer with an opportunity to refute the
competitor’s statements (where the competitor’s actions were unlawful).
Any contention that the independently actionable standard does not adequately
protect business relationships from outside interference should fail. Presumably,
parties in a business relationship do not have a contract terminable only for good
cause because of their deliberate decision not to enter into such a contract. Under
this proposed standard, parties in at-will relationships will receive exactly what they
bargained for—the ability to terminate the relationship for any lawful reason. If
parties want their relationship to receive more protection, then they can (and should)
execute a contract terminable only for cause. The Ohio Constitution explicitly
“protects the freedom” of parties to contract.176
2. Contracts Terminable Only for Good Cause: What Is Improper Conduct Under
Ohio Law
As with at-will contracts and business relationships when competition is lacking,
section 767’s seven factors apply to contracts not terminable at will. Few courts
have analyzed whether a defendant’s actions are improper when a non-at-will
contract was breached or terminated. Ohio law recognizes that non-at-will contracts
are entitled to more protection than at-will contracts and business relationships from
outside interference; thus, more actions fall within the improper category for
contracts not terminable at will than for at-will contracts and business
relationships.177 Accordingly, any act that causes the termination of an at-will
contract or business relationship and is improper (regardless of competition) also
175

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis 2006) (prohibiting employers from
discriminating against their employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, disability, age, or ancestry”).
176

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ohio 2003) (citing OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 28).
177

See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
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must be improper if the act causes the breach or termination of a non-at-will
contract.178
Nonetheless, conduct that is privileged for business relationships is not
necessarily privileged for contracts terminable only for good cause. More extensive
privileges are available to a defendant when the terminated interest is a business
relationship and not a non-at-will contract. Thus, the independently actionable
requirement, under which the range of privileged acts is broad, should not apply to
non-at-will contracts. Rather, Ohio courts should adopt standards that allow
plaintiffs to prove improper conduct more readily when interferers induce the breach
or termination of plaintiffs’ contracts not terminable at will. The following two
sections propose two such standards.
a. Proposed Clarification to Ohio Law for Contracts Not Terminable At Will:
Knowledge Plus an Intent to Cause a Breach or Termination Should Equal Improper
Conduct
For contracts terminable only for good cause, Ohio courts should specifically
adopt the standard that a defendant acts improperly when the defendant: (1) has
actual or constructive knowledge of a non-at-will contract between a plaintiff and
third party; and (2) has an intent to induce a breach or termination of the contract.
The proposed knowledge-plus-intent standard should include not only actual
knowledge of a non-at-will contract, but also constructive knowledge.179 When an
interferer has constructive knowledge of a third party’s contract, the interferer has
intentionally ignored known facts that, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, would
have led to actual knowledge of the third party’s contract that conflicted with the
interferer’s proposed contract.180 Under those circumstances, a defendant’s willful
ignorance rises to the level of improper conduct. If actual knowledge of a non-atwill contract were required, then defendants could fail to reasonably inquire (thus
violate the knowledge element), yet avoid liability on the basis that they had no
actual knowledge of the contract and were privileged to act. Requiring a defendant
to have actual knowledge would undermine the purpose of the constructive
knowledge standard—to discourage interferers from deliberately not learning about
another’s contract.
Ohio courts have not expressly addressed whether knowledge and an intent to
interferer is improper conduct, but they have implicitly done so. The Supreme Court
of Ohio has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 768(2), which provides:
“‘[C]ausing a breach of an existing contract [is] improper interference if the contract
is not terminable at will.’”181 Additionally, a comment to the competitor’s privilege

178
To illustrate, the improper actions falling within categories (1) to (7) above for the
interference with an at-will agreement or business relationship (e.g., committing a fraud) also
are improper when they interfere with a non-at-will contract.
179
Ohio and non-Ohio courts have not addressed whether constructive knowledge is
sufficient under the knowledge-plus-intent requirement.
180

See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.

181

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 861 (Ohio 1999) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1979)).
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of section 768 states that inducing an employee to breach a “contract not to compete”
is not “justified.”182
Further, at least six Ohio courts appear to agree that knowledge, coupled with an
intent to induce a breach or termination of a contract not terminable at will, is
improper interference. In Escape Enterprises v. Gosh Enterprise,183 the court
affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on plaintiff’s claim for interference
with a contract.184
Plaintiff-franchisor informed defendant-competitors that
plaintiff’s agreements with its franchisees required each franchisee to obtain
plaintiff’s consent prior to selling the franchise. Despite defendants’ knowledge of
the prohibitions, they induced many of plaintiff’s franchisees to sell their franchise to
defendants without consent from plaintiff.185 Based on defendants’ knowledge of the
franchise agreements and their intent to interfere, Escape Enterprises affirmed the
lower court’s finding that plaintiff “made a substantial showing of likelihood of
success on the merits” of its interference claim.186 The appellate court explained:
“[E]vidence that [defendants] induced [plaintiff’s] franchisees to breach an
agreement requiring [plaintiff’s] consent . . . would give rise to liability under a
theory of tortious interference.”187
Other Ohio decisions support the adoption of the knowledge-plus-intent standard.
In Credit Consultants v. Gallagher,188 the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of
plaintiff-employer’s claim that defendant-competitor tortiously interfered with its
enforceable non-competition and non-solicitation agreement. While employed with
plaintiff, Mr. Gallagher agreed not to “engage in any business which competes with
the [plaintiff’s] business” and not to “[s]olicit, divert, or take away, any of the
[plaintiff’s] clients.”189 Upon resigning from plaintiff and while working for
defendant, both defendant and Mr. Gallagher started to solicit plaintiff’s
customers.190 Credit Consultants ruled that because “[defendant] apparently
concede[d] that [it] attempted to solicit business from [plaintiff’s] customers while
aware of the covenant not to compete . . . a prima facie case [was] made for proof of
this tort.”191 Four additional Ohio cases are consistent with Escape Enterprises and

182

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. i (1979).

183

Nos. 04AP-834, 04AP-857, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2466 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin
County May 26, 2005).
184

Id. at *1, *2, *7, *32.

185

Id. at *3, *8-9.

186

Id. at *19.

187

Id. at *20.

188

No. 91AP-26, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3063, at *7, *13, *16-17 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin
County June 25, 1991).
189

Id. at *5.

190

Id. at *6, *16.

191

Id. at *16-17.
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Credit Consultants that a defendant acts improperly when it causes the breach or
termination of a known contract that is terminable only for good cause.192
Rulings appearing to the contrary actually support Ohio’s implicit adoption of the
proposition that knowledge plus intent equals improper conduct. Three courts (Kand
Medical, Inc. v. Freund Medical Products, Inc.,193 Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co.,194
and Midland American Sales - Weintraub, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.195) construed
Ohio law and concluded that a defendant’s conduct is proper when the defendant,
without more, “merely enters into an agreement with the other with knowledge that
the other cannot perform both it and his contract with the third person.”196 In Kand,
Heheman, and Midland, the courts found no improper conduct and granted (or
upheld) summary judgment in favor of defendants, even though the defendants knew
about the breached and terminated contracts.197 In each case, although the
defendants had actual knowledge of the contracts at issue, the defendants lacked an

192

MPW Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Pollution Control Sys., Inc., No. 2:02-CV-955, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9360, at *20-25 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2006) (denying summary judgment to
interferer; reasonable jury could find that interferer’s “conduct was improper” where interferer
knew about the non-competition agreement and “nevertheless solicited [third party’s]
business,” although there was no other evidence of unprivileged conduct); Bridge v. Park
Nat’l Bank, No. 03AP-380, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6182, at *2, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin
County Dec. 18, 2003) (reversing the grant of interferer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim
for tortious interference with a contract; plaintiff’s allegation that interferer acted improperly
by intentionally inducing the third party “to repudiate and cancel the contract” it had with
plaintiff with “full knowledge” of the binding contract was sufficient); see A Way of Life, Inc.
v. Schulda, No. 2004-P-0032, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5634, at *5-6, *17 (Ohio Ct. App.
Portage County Nov. 25, 2005) (affirming the denial of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction; implying that had defendant known about the “specific terms” of the
non-competition clause improper conduct would have been shown); Wagoner v. Leach Co.,
No. 17580, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3152, at *38-39, *43-44, *47 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery
County July 2, 1999) (reversing the award of summary judgment in favor of defendant on
plaintiff’s interference claim; “[b]ecause . . . the contract was not terminable at will” and
defendant had actual knowledge of the contract, defendant would be liable if “it intentionally
procured a breach”).
193

963 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1992).

194

661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981).

195

874 F. Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ohio 1995).

196

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 illus. n (1979). See also Kand Med., 963 F.2d
at 129 (citing Horth v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 35 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio Ct. App. Darke County
1940)); see Heheman, 661 F.2d at 1127 (“[M]alicious inducement (is not to) be inferred from
the mere fact that a third party enters into a contract with one of two contracting parties with
knowledge of the existing contract.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Midland,
874 F. Supp. at 167 (“[M]ere knowledge of the plaintiffs contract with the third-party and a
decision to contract with the third-party in the face of that knowledge is insufficient to
establish the tort of business interference.” (citing Horth, 35 N.E.2d 592)).
197

Kand Med., 963 F.2d at 129-30; Heheman, 661 F.2d at 1115; Midland, 874 F. Supp. at
166-67.
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intent to interfere with them,198 or the contract was “exitable” at the will of the third
party.199
In short, Ohio courts should expressly rule that an interferer acts improperly
when the interferer: (1) has actual or constructive knowledge of a contract between a
plaintiff and third party that is terminable only for good cause; and (2) has an intent
to induce a breach or termination of the contract. Once Ohio courts formally
recognize this proposed standard, an interferer will know that it is liable for
tortiously interfering with a contract not terminable at will, even though the interferer
commits no act other than the act that induces the breach or termination of the nonat-will contract and even if that act is lawful.200 As shown below, many non-Ohio
courts have adopted the knowledge-plus-intent standard (courts that, like Ohio
courts, follow Restatement (Second) of Torts for analyzing interference claims201).
In addition, this standard protects the expectancy of parties to non-at-will contracts
that such contracts will remain in effect until the date of termination specified in the
contract or the date of performance.
i. Jurisdictions Outside of Ohio Have Adopted the Standard That Knowledge Plus
Intent Equals Improper Conduct
Many non-Ohio courts have concluded that acting with an intent to induce a
breach or termination of a contract not terminable at will in the face of knowledge of
such a contact, by itself, is improper conduct.202 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
and other federal judges have construed the competitor’s privilege of section 768
(which Ohio courts follow) and ruled: “[C]ompetition is not a defense to a charge of
interfering with an existing contract (for a firm should have no right to compete by
inducing its competitors’ customers to break valid contracts).”203 Deliberate

198
Midland, 874 F. Supp. at 166 (“[Plaintiff] nowhere contends that [defendant] actively
induced [third party] to leave [plaintiff’s] employ or gave [third party] some improper
financial or other incentive to convince [third party] to breach his employment agreement with
[plaintiff].”) (emphasis added); see Heheman, 661 F.2d at 1126-28.
199

Kand Med., 963 F.2d at 128, 129 (finding defendant’s conduct to be privileged where
defendant induced the third party to terminate a contract that the third party told the defendant
was terminable at will; explaining that “[t]here is a significant distinction between
intentionally inducing a breach of contract and intending to induce the lawful termination of a
contract”) (emphasis added).
200
See supra notes 183-92; infra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
conduct was lawful but improper).
201
See supra note 36; infra note 203; United States v. Mansion House Ctr., 767 F. Supp.
995, 1007 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (adopting section 766); Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, 969 S.W.2d
160, 162-65 (Ark. 1998) (adopting section 766); Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327,
337-38 (N.D. 1987) (citing Sections 766 and 767 with approval); Uptown Heights Assocs. v.
Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639, 648 (Or. 1995) (adopting sections 766).
202

See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing cases supporting this
proposition).
203
Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 802 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added); see Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. Long & Foster Real Estate,
Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3394, at *10 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2000) (construing
section 768(2) of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) and applying Maryland law;
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interference, coupled with knowledge of a non-at-will contract, is actionable, “even
if the defendant was engaged in lawful behavior.”204 Indeed, jurisdictions outside of
Ohio have determined as a matter of law that causing the breach or termination of a
known non-competition or exclusivity agreement—non-at-will contracts—is
improper and unprivileged.205
“[w]here there is an existing contract, not terminable at will, between a plaintiff and a third
party, acts by a defendant to induce the third party to breach that contract are, themselves,
improper and wrongful”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pure Distribs. v.
Baker, 285 F.3d 150, 158 (1st Cir. 2002) (construing Massachusetts law; stating that it is
improper “to abet the repudiation of solemn contractual obligations of which the party
interfering is well aware”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
204
Flash Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Mathis v. Liu, 276 F.3d
1027, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2002) (construing Arkansas law and upholding jury verdict for
plaintiff; where defendant persuaded third party to breach his binding contract with plaintiff,
through lawful means, such actions were “improper, especially since inducing a breach of
contract absent compelling justification is, in and of itself, improper”); NBT Bancorp, Inc. v.
Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group Inc., 664 N.E.2d 492, 496 (N.Y. 1996) (“Where there is an existing,
enforceable contract and a defendant’s deliberate interference results in a breach of that
contract, a plaintiff may recover damages for tortious interference with contractual relations
even if the defendant was engaged in lawful behavior.”) (citations omitted).
205

Courts addressing the interference with non-competition agreements are: ANR W. Coal
Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 276 F.3d 957, 971-73 (8th Cir. 2002) (construing North
Dakota law and reversing judgment in favor of interferers; evidence that defendant knew its
actions would interfere with plaintiff’s non-competition agreement was “enough . . . to
establish tortious interference as a matter of law”); Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. CardioDevices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s denial of
interferer’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; “[c]onduct was sufficient to
satisfy the improper motive or means element” under Oregon law where interferer and third
party’s contract “‘explicitly required [third party] to violate [its] covenants not to compete
with [plaintiff]’”); Prison Health Servs., v. Umar & Corr. Med. Care, No. 02-2642, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12288, at *10, *59-61 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2002) (“Plaintiff is also likely to succeed
on the merits of its claim for interference with the Noncompetition Agreement”; despite
defendant’s knowledge of the “Noncompetition Agreements,” defendant “actively solicited
[p]laintiff’s current and prospective customers.”); Quality Carriers, Inc. v. MJK Distrib., Inc.,
No. 02-CV-0148-MJR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5700, at *28-30 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2002) (ruling
that plaintiff was likely to “succeed on the merits of its claim for tortious interference”;
“evidence show[ed] no justification for any of” defendants’ actions where defendants “were
clearly aware of the non-compete clause” and “consipir[ed] to tortiously interfere . . . with the
. . . contract”); Ecolab, Inc. v. K.P. Laundry Mach., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 894, 897-900 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (concluding that plaintiff showed a “likelihood of success on the merits” on its tortious
interference claim; defendant-employer knew of plaintiff’s restrictive covenants with its
employees, yet defendant “intentionally induced several employees to breach the contract” by
offering “indemnification agreements, as well as . . . large salaries” to the employees).
Courts discussing the interference of exclusivity contracts (under which a plaintiff and
third party have an agreement that requires the third party to exclusively use the plaintiff’s
services or goods) include: Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov’t Secs., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp.,
797 F.2d 227, 229-30, 235-36, 237 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming the jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff on its tortious interference with a contract claim and rejecting defendant’s contention
that it “was justified as a matter of law”; once the jury found that defendant knew of the
“exclusive loan broker” agreement between plaintiff and third party and that defendant
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ii. Public Policy Favors the Standard That Knowledge Plus Intent Equals Improper
Conduct
The knowledge-plus-intent standard furthers the public policy of Ohio (and other
jurisdictions) that provides greater protection to contracts terminable only for good
cause than contracts terminable at will. This proposed standard also promotes the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s policy to protect the “fundamental” right of parties to
“contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure according to its
terms.”206 Recall that parties to non-at-will contracts have a legal expectation that
the contract will remain in existence and be performed for the period of time
specified in the contract.207 Holding interferers liable for inducing the breach or
termination of a known non-at-will contract will protect the contracting parties’
expectations by discouraging interferers from attempting to cause a breach or
termination of the contract, thus making it more likely that the terms of the contract
will be fulfilled.
b. Proposed Modification to Ohio Law for Contracts Not Terminable At Will:
Making False or Misleading Statements with Negligence Should Be Improper
Conduct
For contracts terminable only for good cause, Ohio courts should not require an
interferer to make a false statement with actual malice (i.e., with knowledge that the
statement is false or with a reckless disregard to its falsity) for the statement to rise to
the level of improper conduct. The Supreme Court of Ohio and all other Ohio
courts, except one, have adopted the malice standard in the context of at-will
agreements and business relationships.208 No court, however, has specifically
addressed whether a showing of actual malice is necessary for non-at-will contracts.
executed a similar agreement with the third party before the plaintiff’s agreement expired, then
the jury had to conclude that defendant’s agreement with the third party “could not justify
interfering with [plaintiff’s] preexisting exclusive contract”); Air Terminal Servs., Inc. v.
Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., No. 96-2314, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11501, at *10-11
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1996) (denying summary judgment to defendant; plaintiff’s allegations that
“[d]efendant’s actions were intentional, unprivileged, and malicious,” were supported by
evidence that defendant contracted with the third party after learning about “[p]laintiff’s rights
under the exclusivity provision of its contract with [third party]”); Cramer Prods, Inc. v. Int’l
Comfort Prods., Ltd., No. 89-2488-0, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15996, at *19, *22 (D. Kan. Jan.
27, 1989) (issuing a preliminary injunction and ruling that plaintiff “[wa]s likely to succeed”
on its interference claim; despite defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff and third party’s
exclusive agreement, defendant continued to interfere in plaintiff’s exclusive market, which
“suggests that [defendant] unjustifiably and intentionally interfered with the distributor
agreement”); Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp.
1286, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss; where defendant “knew
that [plaintiff] had the exclusive rights to sell” and interfered with that known right, such
action “constitute[d] an interference with contractual relations”).
206

Wallace v. Balint, 761 N.E.2d 598, 604 (Ohio 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Core Funding Group v. McDonald, No. L-05-1291, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1523, at *30
(Ohio Ct. App. Lucas County Mar. 31, 2006) (explaining that agreements “should not be
lightly disregarded” because the “freedom to contract is fundamental” in Ohio).
207

See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.

208

See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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The only Ohio case to adopt the malice standard for a contract not terminable at will
is Andrews v. Carmody.209
Ohio law should reject the malice standard when an interferer causes the breach
or termination of a contract not terminable at will and should adopt a negligence
standard. Under this modification to Ohio law, an interferer engages in unprivileged
conduct when it interferes with a non-at-will contact by making a false or misleading
statement and the interferer should have known that the statement was false or
misleading (i.e., was negligent as to its falsity).210 To avoid liability for tortious
interference, a defendant must act “reasonably in attempting to discover the truth or
falsity” of the interfering statement.211 Although Andrews required malice where the
plaintiff had a non-at-will contract, Andrews does not undermine the adoption of a
negligence standard in Ohio. In Andrews, the plaintiff failed to argue for a standard
other than malice, and Andrews did not consider (but should have considered) that
the defendant caused the breach of a non-at-will contract. Andrews, therefore, failed
to recognize the difference between the binding nature of non-at-will contracts and
at-will agreements and business relationships.
In addition, allowing a showing of negligence (and not requiring malice) to prove
improper conduct promotes Ohio’s policy that contracts not terminable at will
receive more protection against outside interference than at-will agreements and
business relationships. Heightened protection to non-at-will contracts means that
more false and misleading statements should be unprivileged for such contracts than
for business relationships. The application of the less stringent negligence standard
would provide such heightened protection to non-at-will contracts. The negligence
standard, in contrast to a no-fault level, balances Ohio’s interest in enforcing non-atwill contracts with a defendant’s free speech rights under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution.212
Recall that Wake-Up made false statements about Sleepy’s financial condition to
cause Traitor Tom to breach his non-competition agreement. Wake-Up failed to
209

761 N.E.2d 1076, 1078, 1081-82 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County 2001) (affirming the
grant of summary judgment to defendants because they did not make the false statements with
malice when they interfered with plaintiff’s purchase agreement for real property; “there does
not exist any evidence of malice, let alone clear and convincing evidence of malice, to
overcome the privilege”).
210
Of course, if Ohio expressly adopts the knowledge-plus-intent standard, then this
proposed negligence standard would be unnecessary. Any statement made with an intent to
cause a breach or termination of a known non-at-will contract would be improper conduct.
211

Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 457 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ohio
1984) (applying the negligence standard to a defamation claim).
212
Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., 512 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ohio 1987) (indicating
that a no-fault level for a defamation claim raises federal and state constitutional concerns);
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects.”). Under Ohio defamation law and the First Amendment, if a plaintiff is a public
figure or limited public figure, then a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the false
statement with actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974);
Daubenmire v. Sommers, 805 N.E.2d 571, 586-89 (Ohio Ct. App. Madison County 2004).
This Article does not address whether the malice standard in Gertz applies to false statements
that are made for the purpose of inducing a breach or termination of a non-at-will contract of a
public figure plaintiff.
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investigate whether the statements were true and, thus, had an unreasonable belief
that the statements were true. Because the non-competition agreement is not
terminable at will, if Ohio courts reject the knowledge-plus-intent standard but adopt
the negligence standard, then Sleepy could establish that Wake-Up acted improperly
by inducing the breach of the non-competition agreement through the false
statements.
VI. ELEMENT (5): A DEFENDANT MUST CAUSE DAMAGES
The last element of a claim for tortious interference with a contract or a business
relationship requires proof that a defendant’s interference damaged the plaintiff.213
The “goal of tort damages is to place the injured party in the same financial position”
it would have attained in the absence of the tort.214 A plaintiff may recover “all
damages proximately caused by an actor’s misconduct in . . . [its] tortious
interference action.”215 These damages constitute “compensatory damages,” which
account for the actual loss to a plaintiff.216 Consequential, pecuniary, and profit
losses are recoverable as compensatory damages.217 Compensatory damages also
include attorneys’ fees (if any) expended by a plaintiff in a previous action with the
third party for its breach or termination of the plaintiff’s contract218 and the plaintiff’s
expenses incurred in mitigating damages.219 Under limited circumstances, punitive
damages are available.220
Ohio does not, and should not, limit the amount of damages to the amount that is
recoverable for a breach of contract claim against the third party for its breach of the
contract.221 To illustrate, Ohio interference law allows a plaintiff to obtain punitive
213

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ohio 1999).

214

Bemmes v. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 658 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ohio Ct. App.
Warren County 1995); see Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ohio 1975)
(“[M]easure of [tort] damages is normally that amount of money which will compensate and
make whole the injured party.”).
215
Gray-Jones v. Jones, 738 N.E.2d 64, 70 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 2000); UZ
Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1077 (Ohio Ct. App.
Franklin County 2001).
216
Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ohio 1992);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979).
217
Brookeside Ambulance, Inc. v. Walker Ambulance Serv., 678 N.E.2d 248, 253 (Ohio
Ct. App. Lucas County. 1996); Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130,
1133 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1990).
218

See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.

219

See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.

220

See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.

221

Video Towne, Inc. v. RB-3 Assocs., 125 F.R.D. 457, 459 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (“[I]n an
action based upon tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff may recover ‘any
and all damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor’s misconduct . . . includ[ing] but . . . not
limited to those items of damage otherwise recoverable in an action for breach of contract
brought against the defaulting party to the contract.’” (quoting Davison Fuel & Dock Co. v.
Pickands Mather & Co., 376 N.E.2d 965, 968 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County 1977)))
(alternation and omission in original; emphasis added).
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damages, even though such damages are not recoverable from the third party for its
breach.222 In addition, any clause in the contract between a plaintiff and third party
that limits the amount of damages for a breach of the contract (i.e., a damage
limitation provision) should not limit the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover
from an interferer. Many non-Ohio courts have expressly ruled that a damage
limitation provision is not enforceable against an interferer.223
A. Lost Profits Are Recoverable
Lost profits of an established business must be proved to a “reasonable certainty”
and may not be “too speculative.”224 “[M]athematical certainty” is not required.225
Demonstrating lost profits of a new business, however, is subject to “greater scrutiny
because there is no track record upon which to base an estimate.”226 Although the
reasonable certainty standard applies to both contract and tort damages, it is less
demanding in the tort context.227 Profits are limited to “the loss sustained by the
222

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that punitive
damages are not recoverable “for a breach of contract”); see infra note 243 and accompanying
text.
223

See Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 454-55 (5th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the limitation of liability clause contained in the
agreement between plaintiff and third party, which provided that “[i]n no event will either
party be liable to the other for incidental, special or consequential damages,” precluded
plaintiff from recovering damages on its tortious interference claim; “[t]o allow [defendant] to
enforce the limitation would undermine the ‘aim of awarding damages for tortious
interference’”) (citation omitted); LDCircuit, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d
1246, 1259 (Kan. 2005) (“[A] valid tort claim may be able to overcome a contractual
limitation of liability provision in the appropriate circumstances.”); Richland State Bank v.
Household Credit Servs. Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056, 1058 (D.S.D. 2004) (denying
summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s interference claim; determining that
limitation of liability provision, which stated that third party was not “liable for any penalties
or damages including . . . anticipated and unanticipated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of
collection,” was inapplicable to interference claim); CompuSpa, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 613, 627-28 (D. Md. 2002) (denying defendant’s FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) motion; “the limit[ation] [of] liability clause will not be enforced with respect to
Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim”); Medline Indus. Inc. v. Maersk Med. Ltd., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 857, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[L]iability provision d[id] not preclude [plaintiff] from
recovering for intentional torts.”).
224
Brookeside Ambulance, Inc. v. Walker Ambulance Serv., 678 N.E.2d 248, 253 (Ohio
Ct. App. Lucas County 1996) (citing City of Gahanna v. Eastgate Props., Inc., 521 N.E.2d
814, 817-18 (Ohio 1988)); see Gunsorek v. Addison, No. 90AP-303, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
256, at *11-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County Jan. 24, 1991) (finding that plaintiffaccountant’s testimony as to the profits of five other car wash businesses over a one-year
period was insufficient to prove future profits of new business).
225

Advanced Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Dayton Data Processing, Inc., No. 12607, 1992 Ohio
App. LEXIS 994, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County Mar. 6, 1992).
226
McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., Nos. 79025, 79125, 79195, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
7038, at *38 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Dec. 26, 2002).
227

Ahmed v. Univ. Hosps. Health Care Sys., Inc., No. 79016, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
1843, at *31 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Apr. 18, 2002) (stating that tort damages are
“held to a less stringent standard of certainty” than contract damages); Brookeside Ambulance,
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plaintiff’s business” and exclude any gains flowing to a defendant because of the
tortious interference.228 An established or new business may prove lost profits with
“reasonable certainty with the aid of expert testimony, economic and financial data,
market surveys and analyses, [and] business records of similar enterprises.”229 The
use of historical sales data also is appropriate to calculate anticipated profits.230
Although expert testimony and market surveys are unnecessary to prove lost profits
to a “reasonable certainty,”231 when used, the surveys must not be based on
“hypothetical” data.232
B. Mitigation Expenses Are Recoverable
Another type of compensatory damages is mitigation expenses. A plaintiff must
mitigate any damages resulting from an interferer’s tort.233 The mitigation of
damages means actions that tend to reduce the amount of damages resulting from a
tort. 234 Mitigation of damages may result in out-of-pocket expenses for a plaintiff.
Such costs are mitigation expenses and are recoverable as damages: “It is a
678 N.E.2d at 254 (“[C]ourts have generally required greater certainty in proof of damages for
breach of contract than for tort.”).
228

Brookeside Ambulance, 678 N.E.2d at 253 (citing Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1990)).
229
AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 555 N.E.2d 634, 640 (Ohio 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
230

Parker v. Priorway Farms Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 99-G-2257, 2000 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5356, at *2, *5, *13-14 (Ohio Ct. App. Geauga County Nov. 17, 2000) (reversing the
grant of summary judgment to interferer; evidence of lost profits was sufficient where
plaintiff’s estate liquidator, based on her previous sales experience, testified that sales would
have exceeded $10,000 in the absence of the interference).
231
McConnell v. Cosco, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (denying
defendant’s summary judgment motion; expert opinion was not necessary to prove lost future
wages because “a reasonable jury could conclude that [plaintiff] would earn some money in
his lifetime”); Brookeside Ambulance, 678 N.E.2d at 253-55 (concluding that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding damage expert’s testimony; where expert relied upon
statistical data and plaintiff’s and defendant’s financial statements and tax returns to calculate
lost profits, no market survey was needed).
232

McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., Nos. 79025, 79125, 79195, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
7038, at *38 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Dec. 26, 2002) (finding that expert testimony
as to “lost sales commissions” should have been excluded; such testimony was “largely
hypothetical since there was no historic record of operations from which lost profits could be
projected”).
233
Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989) (“One
injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could
have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979))) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). Mitigation, though, is not required when the “tortfeasor intended the harm
or was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it[.]” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
234

Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 193 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County

2000).
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fundamental Hornbook law that [a plaintiff] is entitled to recover its expenses
incurred in mitigating damages.”235 Mitigation expenses are recoverable even when
the “efforts turn out to be unsuccessful and actually increase the loss.”236 Only
“expenditures reasonably made . . . in a reasonable effort to avert [further] harm” are
recoverable against an interferer.237 Although not addressed by Ohio law, if
mitigation efforts prove to be successful, the resulting benefits to a plaintiff should
not reduce the amount of recoverable mitigation expenses. Any windfall should be
awarded to a plaintiff and not the interferer, the party who caused the harm to the
plaintiff.238 Otherwise, the interferer would be rewarded for its tortious conduct.
C. Attorneys’ Fees Are Recoverable
A plaintiff also may recover any attorneys’ fees it incurred in litigation with a
third party to prove that its breach or termination of the contract or business
relationship was unlawful. Such attorneys’ fees constitute compensatory damages:
[W]here the wrongful act of the defendant has involved the plaintiff in
litigation with others or placed him in such relation with others as makes
it necessary to incur . . . attorneys’ fees, [such fees] should be treated as
the legal consequences of the original wrongful act and may be recovered
as damages.239
Section 914(2) of Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly provides that
attorneys’ fees expended as a result of a tort of a defendant are recoverable.240 Only
235

Shenandoah Energy Corp. v. Blue Creek Coal, Inc., No. CA-1369, 1979 Ohio App.
LEXIS 9574, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Tuscarawas Cty. Dec. 28, 1979) (involving a tort claim).
236

W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612, 625, (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d,
202 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2000).
237
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 919(2) (1979); W.D.I.A. Corp.,34 F. Supp. 2d at
625; (setting forth similar proposition).
238

Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 441 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that when
allocating a “windfall” between the “victim and the tortfeasor it is always preferable to favor
the victim”); Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County 2005)
(“[S]hould a windfall arise, . . . the party to profit . . . is the person who has been injured, not
the one whose wrongful acts caused the injury.”).
239
Hollon v. Abner, No. C960182, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3814, at *11, (Ohio Ct. App.
Hamilton County Aug. 29, 1997) (affirming the award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff, fees
incurred as a result of defendant’s breach of its contract) (quoting S & D Mech. Contractors,
Inc. v. Enting Water Conditioning Sys., Inc., 593 N.E.2d 354, 363 (Ohio Ct. App.
Montgomery County 1991) (concluding that because plaintiff incurred $4,000 in fees in legal
negotiations with a third party, such fees were recoverable as the “legal consequence of
[defendant’s] wrongful breach”) (alteration added)); see Shanker v. Columbus Warehouse Ltd.
P’ship, No. 99AP-772, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2391, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County
June 6, 2000) (noting that attorneys’ fees may be awarded as either costs of the litigation or as
compensatory damages).
240

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914(2) (1979). Ohio courts have cited this
provision with approval. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Wright State Univ., 610
N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1992); Reiner v. Kelley, 457 N.E.2d 946,
952-53 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1983).
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reasonable attorneys’ fees are recoverable as damages.241 Attorneys’ fees incurred in
litigating a plaintiff’s interference claim against an interferer, however, are costs of
the litigation and are not recoverable.242
D. Punitive Damages Are Recoverable
In addition to compensatory damages, the trier of fact may award punitive
damages.243 Ohio Rev. Code section 2315.21 authorizes an award of punitive
damages for any “tort action,”244 including claims of tortious interference.245 Under
section 2315.21(B) and (C), a plaintiff must prove “by clear and convincing
evidence” that a defendant acted with “malice.”246 The Supreme Court of Ohio
defines malice as: “(1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is
characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge[;] or (2) a conscious disregard
for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing
substantial harm.”247 Punitive damages are intended “not to compensate a plaintiff,
but to punish and deter” a defendant’s conduct.248 A “conscious disregard” requires
an interferer to have “subjective knowledge” that its actions will harm others.249 An
employer may act with a conscious disregard toward a plaintiff when the employer
encourages its employees to solicit the customers of the plaintiff with knowledge that
the employees’ restrictive covenants prohibit such solicitations.250

241

Reiner, 457 N.E.2d at 953 (stating that appellee was entitled to “the reasonable value of
attorney fees” expended in the collateral litigation action).
242

Hollon, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3814, at *10 (“[P]arties to an action are responsible for
their own attorney fees.”).
243

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (LexisNexis 2006).

244

Id. § 2315.21(A)(1) (defining “tort action” as “a civil action for damages for injury or
loss to person or property”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245

De Boer Structures (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 934,
950 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“[A] Plaintiff may recover punitive damages on a tort claim.”); Ohio
Cellular Prods. Corp. v. Adams USA Inc., No. 3:94 CV 7251, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19657,
at *24 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2000) (“Ohio permits recovery for punitive damages based on
intentional interference with a business relationship.” (citing Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v.
Safety-Kleen Oil Servs., Inc., 611 N.E.2d 955, 966 (Ohio Ct. App. Summit County 1992))),
aff’d, 50 F.App’x. 422 (6th Cir. 2002).
246

Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 608 (Ohio 1998) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2315.21(LexisNexis 2006)).
247

Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994).

248

Id.

249

Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott Ltd. P’ship, 659 N.E.2d 1242, 1247-48 (Ohio 1996).

250

UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1084-85
(Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 2001) (affirming jury award of punitive damages against
interferer-employer because it acted with a “conscious disregard for plaintiff’s rights”;
explaining that interferer assigned plaintiff’s former employees to their former sales territory
and had the employees solicit the customers they serviced while employed with plaintiff, all in
violation of the employees’ non-solicitation and non-competition agreements).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

53

392

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:339

E. Application of the Sleepy/Wake-Up Hypothetical to the Damage Element
Assuming that Sleepy could establish the other four elements of its interference
claims, Sleepy may recover its compensatory damages resulting from Wake-Up’s
hiring of Traitor Tom and Traitor Tom’s successful solicitation of three customers of
Sleepy. Sleepy has incurred the following damages: (1) $500,000 of lost annual
profits from each of the three customers who switched to Wake-Up (based on
historical data over a ten-year period); (2) $10,000 in mitigation expenses in Sleepy’s
failed attempts to find a suitable replacement for Traitor Tom; and (3) attorneys’ fees
that Sleepy will incur as a result of litigating its tortious interference claims against
Traitor Tom and Wake-Up. Based on current Ohio law, Sleepy could recover its lost
annual profits of $1.5 million and its $10,000 in mitigation expenses. It is irrelevant
that Sleepy’s efforts to replace Traitor Tom have been unsuccessful, as long as the
mitigation expenses were reasonable. Any attorneys’ fees incurred to litigate
Sleepy’s interference claims against Traitor Tom and Wake-Up, however, are costs
of pending litigation and are not recoverable as compensatory damages. If Sleepy
incurs attorneys’ fees in a lawsuit against Traitor Tom for his breach of the
non-competition agreement, then those fees could be recovered from Wake-Up as
compensatory damages.
As to punitive damages, Wake-Up has acted, and is acting, with a conscious
disregard to Sleepy’s right to enforce the non-competition agreement. Despite actual
knowledge of that agreement, Wake-Up continues to encourage Traitor Tom to
solicit Sleepy’s customers (e.g., by providing him with financial resources). Such
actions are sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Wake-Up acted with malice.
VII. PROPOSED CLARIFICATION TO OHIO LAW FOR CONTRACTS NOT TERMINABLE
AT WILL: THE RELEVANT PERIOD OF INTERFERENCE SHOULD EXTEND TO THE
TERMINATION DATE OF THE CONTRACT
Another aspect of a claim for tortious interference with a contract that Ohio
courts (and most other courts) have failed to address is what constitutes the relevant
period of interference for the purpose of establishing an interference claim. Of
course, the relevant period of interference includes a defendant’s intentional and
improper acts committed prior to the date of breach of a non-at-will contract.251
Ohio law is unclear, however, whether the relevant period also includes an
interferer’s actions (or knowledge of the contract) that occur after the non-at-will
contract is breached but before the contract is terminated. Many contracts terminable
only for good cause are not terminated on the same date that the contract is breached.
For example, contracts between manufacturers and their dealers often provide the
breaching party with an opportunity to cure the breach within a set number of days
before the non-breaching party may terminate the contract.
Ohio courts should clarify interference law and expressly rule that the relevant
period of interference includes an interferer’s knowledge and actions until the date
on which a non-at-will contract is terminated (designated “post-breach, pre251
Escape Enters., Ltd. v. Gosh Enters., Inc., Nos. 04AP-834, 04AP-857, 2005 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2466, at *2-3, *7, *8-9, *32 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County May 26, 2005) (holding
that plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits where defendants contacted and
solicited plaintiff’s franchisees and subsequently the franchisees breached and terminated their
franchise agreements with plaintiff).
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termination knowledge and conduct”), regardless of the date of breach. This
proposed clarification to Ohio law would require courts to consider a defendant’s
knowledge and conduct through a contract’s termination date in analyzing a
plaintiff’s proof of its claim for tortious interference with a contract. A defendant
could be held liable, therefore, even if the defendant either learns about the
non-at-will contract or acts improperly after the contract is breached, as long as the
contract remains in effect and the defendant continues to interfere (e.g., it causes the
termination of the contract). This proposed period promotes sound public policy and
is consistent with both Ohio law and the majority of jurisdictions outside of Ohio
that have adopted section 766 of Restatement (Second) of Torts.252
A. Current Ohio Law Supports the Inclusion of Post-Breach, Pre-Termination
Knowledge and Conduct as Part of the Relevant Period
Ohio courts have not directly discussed what constitutes the relevant period of
interference, but they have implied that this period extends until the date of
termination of the contract. In determining what damages resulted from the
defendant’s tortious interference, one Ohio court concluded that “post-contract
breach events and circumstances which bear directly on the contract which was
breached” must be considered.253 In addition, the Sixth Circuit has explained that
parties to a contract must fulfill their contractual duties until the contract is no longer
in effect. When a contract has a notice period, for example, “the contract remains in
force and must continue to be performed according to its terms during the specified
period after receipt of the notice of termination.”254
The accrual date for a claim of tortious interference provides further support for
defining the interference period as including post-breach, pre-termination knowledge
and conduct. The accrual date for a claim of tortious interference is not when a
contract is breached, but is the date on which the contract is terminated. The accrual
date for a tortious interference claim is determined under Ohio Rev. Code
section 2305.09(D).255 The Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that a tort claim subject
to section 2305.09(D) does not accrue until the time a plaintiff sustains actual injury

252
Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(“Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted both §§ 766 and 767 . . . .”); Shafir v. Steele,
727 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Mass. 2000) (“[Sections] 766 and 766B reflect the law of
Massachusetts.”); Reihmann v. Foerstner, 375 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa 1985) (adopting
Section 766).
253

Scanlon v. Gordon F. Stofer & Bros., Nos. 55467, 55472, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2528,
at *53 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County June 22, 1989).
254
Digital Storage, Inc. v. ePlus Group, Inc., 65 F.App’x. 37, 38 (6th Cir. 2003)
(construing Ohio law and upholding the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on its breach
of contract claim; ruling that defendant was obligated to perform the lease until the date of
termination, even though plaintiff had notified defendant that plaintiff was terminating the
lease in ninety (90) days) (citation omitted).
255

See Sommer v. City of Dayton, 556 F. Supp. 427, 434 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (applying fouryear limitation period of Section 2305.09(D) to plaintiff’s tortious interference claim); see also
Tri-State Computer Exchange, Inc. v. Burt, No. C-020345, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2869, at
*15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County June 20, 2003).
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because the injury is the “invasion of a legally protected interest.”256 Before the
termination date, a plaintiff has suffered no legal damages (element five).257 Without
an injury, a plaintiff has no valid cause of action for tortious interference. Thus,
when the dates of breach and termination of a contract are different, a plaintiff must
wait until the contract is terminated (assuming it is) to assert a viable interference
claim because actual injury occurs on the date of termination. If post-breach, pretermination knowledge and conduct are excluded from the relevant period of
interference, then a defendant could act improperly during the waiting period and not
be liable for such an act, even though the improper act occurred prior to the accrual
date of the interference claim.
B. The Majority of Jurisdictions That Have Addressed the Relevant Period of
Interference Agree That It Extends Until the Date on Which the Contract Is
Terminated
Including post-breach, pre-termination knowledge and conduct as part of the
relevant period of interference is supported by most non-Ohio courts that have
addressed this issue. Three cases that have expressly considered a defendant’s
knowledge and actions until the termination date of a contract and concluded that
such knowledge and actions may support a claim for tortious interference are
Peterson v. First National Bank of Iowa,258 Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. Sherry,
Inc.,259 and ID Security System Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint System, Inc.260 In
Peterson, plaintiffs leased farmland from Mr. Staskal. Plaintiffs defaulted on the
rent, thus breaching their lease agreement with Mr. Staskal.261 Over one month after
the breach (but before termination of the contract), on December 6, 1982, defendantbank refused to loan plaintiffs promised funds to cover plaintiffs’ rent.262 The jury
found in favor of plaintiffs on their tortious interference claim against defendantbank.263 In reversing the trial court’s grant of a new trial to defendant, Peterson ruled

256

Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 437 N.E.2d 1194, 1196-97 (Ohio 1982) (reversing the
appellate court and holding that the negligence claim accrued when the insured equipment was
damaged); Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 147, 150 (Ohio 1982)
(“[W]here the wrongful conduct complained of is not presently harmful, the cause of action
does not accrue until actual damage occurs.”); see Carter v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 611
N.E.2d 512, 516 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1992) (stating the general proposition that
accrual date begins “when the plaintiff has suffered an injury as a result of the alleged tortious
conduct”).
257
CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir.
2004) (stating that “[e]ven though the allegedly interfering acts were launched before” the
termination date of the contract, “the tort was not consummated until the contract was
terminated”; plaintiff had no “actual legal damages” before the termination of the contact).
258

392 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).

259

656 N.E.2d 312 (Mass App. Ct. 1995).

260

249 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

261

392 N.W.2d at 159, 166.

262

Id. at 160.

263

Id. at 161.
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that “the bank’s alleged interference which occurred on December 6, 1982 . . . was
properly submitted to the jury” because “the contract existed until it was terminated”
roughly four months after the date of breach.264
Based on a defendant’s post-breach actions, Melo-Tone Vending affirmed the
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on its tortious interference claim. Plaintiff and the
third party, Sherry, had a contract where plaintiff retained “the sole and exclusive
right” to place vending machines at Sherry’s business for eight years.265 After Sherry
breached the contract by allowing defendant to place its vending machines at
Sherry’s business, plaintiff informed defendant about Sherry’s exclusive-dealing
contract with plaintiff.266 Subsequently, defendant agreed to pay for the removal of
plaintiff’s machines and to fund Sherry’s litigation expenses against plaintiff.267
Melo-Tone Vending relied upon those post-breach actions and concluded that
defendant acted improperly, emphasizing that defendant knew plaintiff’s contract
“had five years to run” when it paid for Sherry’s legal expenses.268
ID Security Systems also supports this proposed clarification to Ohio law that the
relevant period of interference includes post-breach, pre-termination knowledge and
conduct. The court affirmed the jury verdict against the defendant where defendant
induced the third party, Tokai, to terminate its contract with plaintiff after plaintiff
breached the contract.269 Plaintiff and Tokai had a contract where plaintiff was the
exclusive dealer of Tokai’s product.270 On February 13, 1997, after plaintiff
breached the contract but before Tokai terminated the contract, defendant executed
an agreement with Tokai to sell Tokai’s product, even though their agreement
violated plaintiff’s contract with Tokai.271 Upon signing an agreement with
defendant, Tokai terminated its contract with plaintiff. ID Security Systems rejected
defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s contract with Tokai was not in existence as of
February 13 (the date on which defendant committed the interfering acts).272 The
court explained that evidence that defendant’s actions induced Tokai to terminate its
contract with plaintiff—actions that occurred after the breach—was “legally
sufficient evidence for a jury” to find defendant liable.273

264

Id. at 166 (emphasis added).

265

Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. Sherry, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 312, 313 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).

266

Id.at 314.

267

Id.

268

Id. at 315 (explaining that a party may not “abet the repudiation of solemn contractual
obligations of which the party interfering is well aware”).
269
ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 666, 668-69 (E.D.
Pa. 2003).
270

Id. at 634.

271

Id. at 636, 666.

272

Id. at 669.

273

Id. (denying defendant’s “motion for post-trial relief”). The fact that plaintiff and Tokai
attempted to resolve their dispute after the initial breach indicated that the contract was in
effect on February 13. Id. at 667; accord Groseth Int’l., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d
159, 163, 172 (S.D. 1987) (denying interferer’s motion for summary judgment; issues of fact
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C. Public Policy Supports the Standard That the Interference Period Extends Until
the Date the Contract Is Terminated
Holding an interferer liable for its post-breach, pre-termination knowledge and
conduct ensures that the purpose of this tort—preventing and discouraging
interferers from meddling with the contracts of others—is satisfied.274 The Supreme
Court of Ohio recognizes that enforcing parties’ “right to contract,” even if the
exercise of that right is imprudent, is “one of the roots of its preservation.”275 If Ohio
law extends the relevant period of interference until the date a contract is terminated,
then with the law would help preserve parties’ contracts by discouraging would-be
interferers from attempting to terminate breached contracts still in effect.
To illustrate, consider the situation where a manufacturer has a non-at-will
agreement with Dealer A where both parties must provide sixty days notice to the
breaching party to allow the breaching party the opportunity to cure the breach.
After the manufacturer breaches the agreement, but before the expiration of the cure
period, a competing dealer, Dealer B, makes false statements with malice to the
manufacturer to induce it not to cure its breach of the contract with Dealer A and
instead to execute a new contract with Dealer B. If the relevant period of
interference excludes post-breach, pre-termination conduct, then Dealer B would
escape liability because its false statements were made after the date of breach, thus
undermining the purpose of an interference claim. On the other hand, if the law
subjects Dealer B to liability for its false statements made after the breach but before
the agreement was terminated, then the law would have discouraged Dealer B from
meddling with the agreement during the sixty-day cure period. Thus, Dealer A and
the manufacturer would have had an opportunity to resolve their dispute without
outside interference.
D. Application of the Sleepy/Wake-Up Hypothetical to the Relevant Period of
Interference
As previously discussed, Sleepy informed Wake-Up that its employment of
Traitor Tom violates his non-competition agreement, which remains in effect.
Assume that Sleepy’s interference claim against Wake-Up for interfering with
Sleepy and Traitor Tom’s non-competition agreement is based solely on Wake-Up’s
express refusal to comply with the non-competition agreement once Wake-Up had
actual knowledge of that agreement. Under the standard that the relevant period of
interference extends until a contract is terminated, Wake-Up may be liable because
the non-competition agreement has not expired by its terms and because knowledge
plus an intent to interfere with a contract not terminable at will is improper.276 To
existed where evidence showed that defendant’s tortious conduct occurred after the breach but
prior to the expiration of the six-month notice period).
274
David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement to Breach of
Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REV. 771, 775 (1992) (asserting that the
interference tort serves the purposes of the preservation and maintenance of “cooperative
relationships”).
275
Lake Ridge Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ohio 1993); see Blakeman’s Valley
Office Equip., Inc. v. Bierdeman, 786 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning County
2003) (“Preserving the sanctity of contractual relations . . . [is] in the public interest.”).
276

See supra Part V.B.2.a.
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avoid liability, Wake-Up must act to prevent any further violation of the noncompetition agreement, such as terminating Traitor Tom’s employment or moving
him to a new position.
This result is fair to Traitor Tom because he intentionally placed himself in this
situation. Traitor Tom voluntarily signed the non-competition agreement and
knowingly violated it by working for Wake-Up. He took a calculated risk either that
the agreement would be unenforceable or that Sleepy would not enforce the
agreement. Further, including post-breach, pre-termination knowledge and conduct
as part of the relevant period of interference will encourage third parties such as
Traitor Tom to disclose the existence of their non-at-will contracts to potential
interferers before any interference occurs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ohio courts have not adequately defined what actions constitute tortious
interference with a contract or a business relationship. This Article summarized the
current law of tortious interference in Ohio and argued for the adoption of new or
clearer standards in Ohio based on current Ohio law, tortious interference law of
other jurisdictions, and sound public policy.
First, Ohio courts should allow a plaintiff to establish the knowledge element
through evidence that an interferer had knowledge of sufficient facts and failed to
reasonably inquire whether the third party had a contract or a business relationship
with the plaintiff. This constructive knowledge standard would prevent interferers
from avoiding liability by remaining deliberately ignorant of others’ contracts and
business relationships. Second, Ohio courts should determine whether conduct is
improper and unprivileged based on whether a defendant induced a breach or
termination of a contract not terminable at will or a business relationship. This
standard furthers Ohio’s express public policy that non-at-will contracts deserve
more protection against outside interference than at-will contracts or business
relationships. Pursuant to such heightened protection, Ohio courts should adopt
standards where the universe of conduct that is considered improper is broader for
the breach or termination of a contract not terminable at will than for an at-will
contract or business relationship. Third, Ohio courts should specifically rule that the
relevant period of interference includes an interferer’s knowledge and actions until
the date on which a contract is terminated.
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